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All the Better To Eat You With, My Dear:  
The Need for a Heightened Harm Standard in Utah’s 
Grandparent Visitation Statute 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the classic children’s folktale “Little Red Riding Hood,”1 a 
young girl was deceived by a wolf posing as her grandmother. The 
child willingly approached the disguised wolf—who ultimately ate 
her—because she believed the wolf was her grandmother, someone 
she trusted would never harm her.2 The early proliferation and 
popularity of grandparent visitation statutes was premised on a 
similar assumption: court-ordered grandparent visitation would 
never harm grandchildren.3 Experience has shown, however, that 
court-ordered grandparent visitation against the parent’s wishes may 
be like a wolf in disguise because such visitation is sometimes the 
product of petitions by grandparents willing to act in ways that harm 
their grandchildren and because court-ordered visitation may be 
ultimately harmful even to children ordered to visit with otherwise 
benevolent grandparents.4 
 
 1. See Andrew Lang, Little Red Riding Hood, in THE BLUE FAIRY BOOK 51, 51 
(Andrew Lang ed., Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1965) (1889). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Joan Catherine Bohl, Grandparent Visitation Law Grows Up: The Trend Toward 
Awarding Visitation Only when the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 
279, 281 (2000). 
 4. Laurence C. Nolan, Beyond Troxel: The Pragmatic Challenges of Grandparent 
Visitation Continue, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 267, 269 (2002). For example, court-ordered 
grandparent visitation always “disrupts the normal routine of parents and their children,” and 
this disruption can range from minor to substantial, even perhaps involving cross-country 
airline travel or missed school and extra-curricular activities. Id. at 281. Overnight visitation 
and frequent changes in daily routines and discipline styles are particularly problematic for 
young children. Id. at 283. For parents who must work throughout the week, weekend 
grandparent visitation interferes with the only significant uninterrupted time available for the 
parent-child relationship. Id. at 282. This is especially true for working custodial parents whose 
children have weekend visitation orders with the noncustodial parent as well as with 
grandparents. In fact, grandparent visitation may be a tool used by the noncustodial parent to 
obtain more visitation. Id. Grandparents may expose children to people and/or activities that a 
parent believes will be harmful to the children. See id. at 280. Even if such exposures are not 
inherently harmful, the parent loses the ability to decide with whom the children should 
associate and what activities are in the children’s best interest. Ultimately, the parent must deal 
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 In Utah, there is no common law right of grandparent visitation; 
however, the Utah legislature has authorized statutory grandparent 
visitation since 1975.5 Utah’s current Grandparent Visitation 
Statute6 represents a clash between parents, who have a traditionally 
protected autonomy to make decisions regarding the care, custody, 
and control of their children, and grandparents, who by political fiat 
may now enlist the power of the state to override parental autonomy 
and obtain and enforce court-ordered visitation rights with their 
grandchildren.7 In the resultant controversy, both parties defend 
their positions with the ostensible motive of protecting the best 
interests of the children involved. There is no doubt that out-of-
 
with the consequences of these exposures. Scheduling issues, rescheduling missed visits, and 
parental input about what occurs during grandparent visits are especially difficult to address 
between parents and grandparents already so hostile to each other that they are in court 
fighting over the children. Id. at 273. Children are inevitably exposed to these conflicts 
between parents and grandparents, notwithstanding court orders that adults keep these 
disputes to themselves. Id. at 284. Children may be harmed by the loss of household income 
that a parent must expend to defend against the grandparents’ visitation lawsuit; this expense 
may be so burdensome that many parents may not be able to mount a defense. Id. at 272. 
Finally, children may be harmed by the sanctions courts can impose on their parents while 
enforcing grandparent visitation, such as make-up visitation, additional parental time and 
household income expended on court-ordered counseling or mediation, attorney’s fees, fines 
or payment of the grandparents’ attorney’s fees, or even incarceration. Id. at 277; see also 
Stephen A. Newman, Grandparent Visitation Claims: Assessing the Multiple Harms of 
Litigation to Families and Children, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 21, 23 (2003) (pointing out that 
courts, in almost all cases, hear grandparent visitation disputes involving families whose 
relationships are fundamentally broken, appraising the “negative consequences of 
intergenerational litigation and the harms caused by state-coerced grandparent visitation in the 
context of the malfunctioning extended family,” and arguing that a very high degree of 
deference be given to the parent’s visitation decision to prevent harm to children); Theresa H. 
Sykora, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Are the Best Interests of the Grandparent Being Met 
Before Those of the Child?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 753, 761 (1996) (describing studies that analyze 
various forms of grandparent-grandchild interactions, arguing that courts often fail to 
appropriately analyze the child’s best interest in light of the harms visitation orders may cause, 
and concluding that a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions for their children must 
include even the right to be temporarily wrong about a visitation decision). 
 5. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953) (amended 1975); see also Family Court Act, 
ch. 72, 1969 Utah Laws 327. 
 6. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(1)–(2) (Supp. 2005). 
 7. See Joan C. Bohl, The “Unprecedented Intrusion”: A Survey and Analysis of Selected 
Grandparent Visitation Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 31 (noting the “impressive political cloud 
wielded by a graying America” that has resulted in broad grandparent visitation statutes 
enforceable through “the awesome power of the state”); Michael K. Goldberg, Over the River 
and Through the Woods—Again: The New Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act, 29 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 403, 409 (2005) (quoting one U.S. representative as saying that “[i]t is a well known fact 
that seniors are the most active lobby in this country, and when it comes to grandparents there 
is no one group more united in their purpose”). 
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wedlock births, increased divorce rates, and other factors are 
changing the family structures in which children are raised. This may 
result in children having, for at least some period of time, meaningful 
parent-like interactions with extended family members upon which 
the children come to rely.8 Depending on the circumstances, these 
relationships may be deserving of court protection. But in other 
cases, the controversy represents an unwarranted attempt by 
grandparents to forcibly infringe upon a parent’s fundamental right 
and obligation to direct a child’s upbringing, or it represents an 
intrusion into a purely intra-familial dispute in which courts have 
historically declined to intervene.9 Because legitimate claims to 
safeguard children exist alongside spurious demands, a state is at 
times justified in the exercise of its parens patriae10 power to override 
grandparent visitation decisions made by parents. However, concerns 
over the constitutionality of Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute, 
both facially and as applied, are also justified because great harm to 
children and parents may result from abuse of state power where the 
state’s parens patriae interest is not implicated. 
 Since its inception, Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute has 
undergone numerous revisions and amendments.11 Although two of 
the Statute’s amendments12 were direct attempts to comply with 
state and federal constitutional mandates,13 ongoing constitutional 
controversy has plagued the Statute.14 This is partly due to the 
 
 8. See Lawrence Schlam, Standing in Third-Party Custody Disputes in Arizona: Best 
Interests to Parental Rights—And Shifting the Balance Back Again, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 719, 720 
(2005). 
 9. See Laurence C. Nolan, Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother: But Court-Ordered 
Grandparent Visitation in the Intact Family?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 51, 53 & n.10 (1993). 
 10. Literally means “parent of his or her country”; a doctrine authorizing state 
intervention on behalf of those unable to protect themselves. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 
(8th ed. 2004). 
 11. See Pilot Program Repeal Clean-Up, ch. 129, 2005 Utah Laws 1215; Visitation 
Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298; Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 
265, 2000 Utah Laws 1107; Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361; 
Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 257, 1995 Utah Laws 834; Visitation Rights of 
Grandparents and Other Immediate Family Members, ch. 152, § 2, 1993 Utah Laws 593; 
Grandparents’ Rights Extended, ch. 175, 1992 Utah Laws 676; Grandparents’ Visitation 
Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566. 
 12. See Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298; Grandparents 
Visitation Rights, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361. 
 13. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 
635, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 14. See Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083. 
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United States Supreme Court’s splintered opinion in Troxel v. 
Granville,15 which left substantial leeway to state legislatures to draft 
grandparent visitation statutes within its constitutional confines. The 
controversy is also partly due to ongoing social transformation about 
the definition of “family” and the resulting legislative and judicial 
uncertainty regarding the amount of protection that should be 
afforded to meaningful, non-parental relationships with children. 
The recent Utah Supreme Court decision Uzelac v. Thurgood (In 
re Estate of S.T.T.)16 affirmed the constitutionality of Utah’s current 
Grandparent Visitation Statute because the Statute complied with 
the due process requirements mandated in Troxel v. Granville.17 
Simultaneously, the decision acknowledged that the current statute, 
although constitutional, is flawed, confusing, and difficult for courts 
to apply.18 The Utah Supreme Court called for greater legislative 
clarity regarding the multiple factors courts must consider before 
making an award of grandparent visitation.19 Specifically, the court 
encouraged the Utah legislature to issue guidelines on the weight to 
be given to each of the Statute’s several factors and attempted to aid 
the legislature by grouping these factors into three categories.20 
However, the court’s suggestions for revising the Statute, as well as 
its as-applied analysis in Thurgood, failed to address important factual 
and policy considerations that the legislature should explore prior to 
amending the Statute. 
This Comment argues that Utah’s Grandparent Visitation 
Statute should be amended to require grandparents to show, as a 
threshold consideration, that a parent is unfit to make a visitation 
decision that is in the children’s best interest. Alternatively, 
grandparents should be required to show that the children’s health, 
safety, and welfare would be harmed more without a visitation order 
than with a visitation order. If grandparents can make this showing, 
the court should then examine whether the amount and type of 
visitation preferred by the parent is reasonably suited to prevent the 
harm that would be caused without a visitation order. If it is, the 
 
 15. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Troxel v. Granville is the Supreme Court’s only grandparent 
visitation case to date. 
 16. 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083. 
 17. Id. ¶¶ 26–36. 
 18. Id. ¶ 36. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. ¶¶ 26–35. 
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court should defer to the parent. Requiring grandparents to make a 
heightened showing that a visitation order would prevent harm to 
the child is the most appropriate way to balance the competing needs 
and claims of children, parents, and grandparents. 
 In support of these propositions, Part II of this Comment 
considers the enactment and early history of Utah’s Grandparent 
Visitation Statute.21 Part III discusses the first constitutional 
challenge to the Statute in Campbell v. Campbell, the resulting 1998 
amended Statute cited favorably in Troxel v. Granville, and the 
poorly timed 2000 amendment that passed while Troxel was pending 
before the U.S. Supreme Court. Part IV summarizes the Troxel 
holdings, addresses their incorporation into Utah’s 2002 and 2005 
amendments, and analyzes the remaining precedential value of 
Campbell prior to Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.). Part V 
introduces Utah’s two post-Troxel grandparent visitation cases—
Pasquin v. Souter22 and Thurgood—and explores the implications of 
the court’s recent decision in Thurgood. Finally, Part VI argues that 
amending Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute to require a 
heightened showing of harm better balances the competing interests 
in grandparent visitation cases. Part VI also briefly summarizes recent 
post-Troxel interpretations of state grandparent visitation statutes by 
other states and, in particular, the approaches taken by states in the 
Rocky Mountain area. Part VII provides a brief conclusion. 
II. THE ENACTMENT AND EARLY AMENDMENT HISTORY OF 
UTAH’S GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE 
The origin and history of Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute 
must be examined to provide needed context for asserting that the 
Statute should incorporate a heightened harm standard. Because the 
first reference to visitation for grandparents occurred in the context 
of a Utah Code section addressing divorce proceedings, the likely 
purpose of the early statute was to protect children from the harm of 
losing significant extended family relationships in an increasingly 
divorce-ridden society. This Part will show how both the legislature 
 
 21. The Statute’s provisions regarding adoption will not be addressed as they are 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 22. Pasquin v. Souter, No. 970910481 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. July 8, 2001) (mem.), aff’d 
mem., 2003 UT App 10. 
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and the courts have had difficulty settling on the principles to apply 
to the visitation doctrine during its early development.  
By the time the first constitutional challenge to Utah’s 
Grandparent Visitation Statute arose in 1995, visitation was largely 
an adult-centered right that imposed few or no obligations on the 
individuals awarded visitation. This led to grandparent visitation 
decisions23 that were at odds with fundamental parental rights and 
that were arguably far removed from the Statute’s purpose of 
protecting children from the harm of losing significant extended 
family relationships. 
A. The 1975 Precursor to, and the 1977 Enactment of, the Utah 
Grandparent Visitation Statute 
In Utah, statutory “grandparent visitation” began as a segment 
of the Utah Code provision dealing with divorce proceedings in a 
1975 amendment to the 1969 Family Court Act.24 Prior to 1975, 
the term “visitation” was completely absent from any Utah Code 
section regarding children. The 1975 amendment’s provision for 
child custody determinations upon divorce25 gave courts jurisdiction 
over “visitation rights of parents, grandparents and other relatives” 
while requiring that courts “take into consideration the welfare of 
the child.” 26 
Although this provision was an extension of the court’s statutory 
jurisdiction over children upon divorce and not a per se 
“grandparent visitation statute,” at least one case reveals that as early 
as 1976 the Utah Supreme Court was aware of, and approved, the 
early stages of the national grandparent visitation trend.27 In Wilson 
v. Family Services Division, which was not a grandparent visitation 
case,28 a grandmother was granted a hearing to determine her 
 
 23. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 24. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953) (amended 1975); see also Family Court Act, 
ch. 72, 1969 Utah Laws 327. 
 25. Family Court Act, ch. 72, 1969 Utah Laws 327 (codified as amended at UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(5) (2004)). 
 26. Act to Provide the Court with the Discretion to Award Visitation Rights to 
Grandparents, ch. 81, 1975 Utah Laws 331, 332 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 
30-3-5(5)(a) (2004)). 
 27. Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976). This may have been a 
judicial herald of approval for grandparent visitation legislation in Utah. 
 28. See id. at 230–31. 
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suitability to adopt her grandchild after the parental rights of the 
child’s parents had been terminated.29 In reaching its decision, the 
Utah Supreme Court averred in dicta that “[t]he affection of a 
grandparent can safely be said to be no less in depth than parental 
affection,”30 and the court favorably cited a Wisconsin case 
recognizing a “grandparent’s right of visitation.”31 
One year later in 1977, the legislature separately enacted what is 
known today as the Grandparent Visitation Statute, codified as 
section 30-5-2 of the Utah Code.32 Grandparents’ visitation rights 
under the divorce proceedings section of the Family Code Act 
remained intact.33 With this enactment, the legislature expanded 
grandparents’ standing to bring a visitation petition to include 
grandparents whose child—the parent of the grandchild—was dead 
or living out of state after divorce or legal separation.34 The 1977 
enactment also changed the standard for visitation decision-making 
from the “welfare of the child” standard to the “best interests” 
standard and gave district courts authority to “grant grandparents 
reasonable rights of visitation to grandchildren, if it was in the best 
interest of the grandchildren.”35 
These early statutes represented an attempt to protect children 
from at least some of the harmful effects of a parent’s death or 
divorce by granting grandparents the ability to petition for visitation 
in appropriate cases so that, when necessary, some degree of 
extended family continuity could be maintained in the children’s 
lives. 
 
 29. Id. at 228–29.  
 30. Id. at 230 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Shannon, 164 A. 352, 354 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1933)). 
 31. Id. (citing Weichman v. Weichman, 184 N.W.2d 882 (Wis. 1971)). 
 32. Grandparents’ Visitation Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566. 
 33. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(5)(a) (2004). 
 34. Grandparents’ Visitation Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566. 
 35. Id. Originally, the “best interest” standard was vaguely defined and could include 
anything and everything the court deemed relevant. Although some statutes and courts have 
attempted to outline factors to consider under a best interests analysis, see, e.g., Uzelac v. 
Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 43 n.9, 144 P.3d 1083, and the weight to 
be given to these factors, the standard is still quite vague and is often weighted according to 
the judge’s own background and perceptions. See Jeff Atkinson, The Current Face of Best 
Interests, 26-WTR FAM. ADVOC. 18 (2004). 
SCHOFIELD.MRO.COM 1/23/2007 2:16:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1676 
B. Early Indirect Interpretations Disconnecting Visitation Rights  
with a Child from Obligations to the Child 
There is no record of appellate-level litigation over the 
Grandparent Visitation Statute for many years; in fact, in 1991 the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Kasper v. Nordfelt asserted that no case 
had yet construed the fourteen-year-old Grandparent Visitation 
Statute.36 However, early cases that generally interpreted visitation 
doctrine impacted the interpretation of the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute by disconnecting visitation rights with the child from parent-
like obligations to the child.37 The effect of these visitation 
interpretations has been an increased emphasis on the rights and 
desires of adults rather than a focus on preventing harm to children. 
These changes have contributed to the current need for the Utah 
legislature to refocus the Grandparent Visitation Statute on 
preventing harm to children by implementing a heightened harm 
standard. 
Early in the evolution of the visitation doctrine, both the 
legislature and the courts favored imposing parent-like obligations 
and duties prior to granting a party standing to petition for visitation 
privileges.38 In Gribble v. Gribble, “consideration [of] the welfare of 
the child” influenced the court to consider the visitation rights of 
stepparents—a class of persons traditionally and statutorily without 
standing to petition for visitation.39 The court remanded for a 
hearing to determine three issues: first, whether the stepfather stood 
in loco parentis to the stepchild; second, whether it was in the child’s 
best interest to have visitation with the stepfather; and third, whether 
any visitation granted to the stepfather should be made conditional 
upon accepting the responsibilities incurred by enjoying the “rights of a 
natural parent.”40 Later, the Utah legislature imposed on 
stepparents a legal support obligation for stepchildren and coupled 
this obligation with standing to seek visitation rights in the best 
interest of the child.41 Together, Gribble and the stepparent 
 
 36. 815 P.2d 747, 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
 37. See In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 714–15 (Utah 1990). 
 38. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1987); 
 Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1978). 
 39. 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1975)). 
 40. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1987). 
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legislation indicate early support for the idea that parent-like 
obligations to the child were inseparable from visitation rights and 
privileges.42 
However, a few years later in In re J.W.F.,43 the Utah Supreme 
Court moved away from a visitation doctrine that combined legal 
support obligations with standing to petition for a custody or 
visitation order.44 The court cited Utah’s Grandparent Visitation 
Statute as an example of standing for visitation being based on 
“status or relationship to the child” rather than on the existence of 
legal obligations and responsibilities toward the child.45 As a result, 
the court determined that visitation petitions by “[t]hose who have 
legal or personal connections with the child” should be heard on the 
basis of the child’s best interest.46 Since then, Utah’s visitation 
philosophy has separated parent-like obligations from visitation 
rights, following a national trend that emphasizes individual adult 
rights over obligations toward children—often with detrimental 
results.47 
The effect of this trend encourages visitation petitioners to view 
themselves as having status equal to all other persons with whom a 
child has a relationship, including a child’s own biological parents.48 
 
 42. The Utah Supreme Court quoted Gribble in its recent Thurgood case: “The 
[grandparent visitation statute] amendment reflected the ‘legislative intent to protect the 
relationships which affect the child whose parents are being divorced, and to be sensitive to the 
fact that relationships beyond those of parent-child may be important enough to protect vis-à-
vis visitation.’” Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 16, 144 P.3d 
1083 (quoting Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66). However true this may be, this language is dicta and 
should not be used in support of a broad interpretation of the grandparent visitation statute. 
See Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66. Gribble was limited to addressing visitation for a stepparent who 
may have engaged in significant parenting functions over a period of time on behalf of the 
child and was reviewed in the context of a remand to the trial court to decide whether the 
imposition of parent-like obligations on this stepfather should be inseparable from granting 
him standing to seek visitation. Id. at 68. 
 43. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). 
 44. Id. at 715. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 716 (emphasis added). 
 47. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Parenthood and the Limits of Adult Autonomy, 24 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 169 (2005); Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: 
The Constitutional Rights of Children, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 332–34 (1996). 
 48. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The 
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 
879, 882 (1984) (arguing that “the child’s need for continuity in intimate relationships 
demands that the state provide the opportunity to maintain” such “relationships with adults 
outside of nuclear families” (emphasis added)). 
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As this philosophy took hold, it was not surprising that the number 
of grandparent visitation lawsuits increased nationwide as some 
grandparents began to feel entitled to visitation rights even over 
parents’ objections.49 Unfortunately, this trend has further taken the 
focus of grandparent visitation statutes away from preventing harm 
to children. 
C. Expansion and Retraction: The 1992, 1993, and 1995 
Amendments 
For unknown reasons in the early 1990s, the Utah legislature 
first expanded and then retracted visitation rights available under the 
Grandparent Visitation Statute. Whether or not this statutory 
fiddling represented purposeful legislative efforts to experiment with 
various approaches to the Statute, by 1995 the legislature had 
rejected a more expansive visitation approach. 
In 1992, the Statute was amended to extend standing to seek 
grandparent visitation to all grandparents, not just those whose child 
had died or undergone divorce or legal separation.50 Next, in 1993 
“other immediate family members,” in addition to all grandparents, 
were granted standing to seek visitation rights with children.51 Also, 
parents became subject to the same penalties for noncompliance with 
court-ordered grandparent visitation that applied to parents who 
failed to comply with visitation orders with each other under the 
divorce statute.52 However, in 1995 these expansions were retracted, 
and once again, standing under the Grandparent Visitation Statute 
was restricted to grandparents whose child had died or was deemed a 
noncustodial parent following divorce.53 
 
 49. See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing 
Interdependency in the Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1350–51 (1994) (suggesting that some 
grandparents come to consider access to their grandchildren as a competition with the child’s 
parents that they have an equal right to win). 
 50. Grandparents’ Rights Extended, ch. 175, 1992 Utah Laws 676. 
 51. Sanctions for Denial of Child Visitation, ch. 152, § 2, 1993 Utah Laws 592, 593. 
 52. Compare Sanctions for Denial of Child Visitation, ch. 152, § 1, 1993 Utah Laws 
592, with Sanctions for Denial of Child Visitation, ch. 152, § 2, 1993 Utah Laws 593. These 
penalties could include make-up visitation, requirements to participate in workshops, 
counseling, classes to educate the parent about the importance of complying with the court 
order, ten to twenty hours of community service, fines, jail sentences, or changes in custody. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-12.2 (1993) (repealed as applied to UTAH CODE ANN.  
§ 30-5-2 by Pilot Program Repeal Clean-Up, ch. 129, § 2(6), 2005 Utah Laws 1215). 
 53. Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 257, 1995 Utah Laws 834. 
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While no explicit reason for these changes can be found,54 it is 
obvious that although the structure of the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute had changed since it was enacted, the rights available under 
the 1995 statute remained identical to those originally granted in the 
1977 statute.55 Specifically, a reasonable right of grandparent 
visitation was only available to grandparents whose child had died or 
undergone divorce or legal separation, and where the visitation was 
found to be in the best interest of the grandchildren.56 Presumably, 
by rejecting a more expansive authorization of visitation and 
returning to the Statute’s original formulation, the legislature also 
affirmed its approval of the Statute’s original purpose of protecting 
children from the harmful loss of significant extended family 
relationships in limited circumstances. In this setting, the first case to 
construe Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute and challenge its 
constitutionality arose in 1995.57 
III. IMPETUS FOR CHANGE: THE CAMPBELL V. CAMPBELL 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE AND THE POST-CAMPBELL 
AMENDMENTS 
Campbell v. Campbell represented a Utah appellate court’s first 
opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute. The court found the Statute to be constitutional,58 
but in the process it ignored the Statute’s original purpose of 
preventing harm to children caused by the loss of extended family 
relationships. 
Although the court acknowledged the constitutional concerns 
presented by the Statute and imposed some limitations on its 
application, the court’s statutory interpretation still authorized 
substantial intrusions on parental autonomy.59 The opinion clearly 
favored judicial—not parental—determination of what constitutes a 
 
 54. The author was unable to locate any legislative history of these bills or of the 
sessions in which they were passed to uncover an explanation for these changes. 
 55. Compare Grandparents’ Visitation Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566, with 
Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 257, 1995 Utah Laws 834. 
 56. Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 257, 1995 Utah Laws 834. 
 57. See Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 58. Id. at 640–44. 
 59. Id. at 642–43. This is true despite the court’s claim that the statute did not 
“substantially infringe on the parent’s fundamental rights or the autonomy of the nuclear 
family.” Id. at 642. 
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child’s best interest regarding “reasonable” grandparent visitation 
decisions.60 
The Campbell court’s constitutional approval of the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute emboldened the Utah legislature to amend it in 
1998 to substantially expand grandparent visitation.61 In so doing, 
the legislature actually passed a statute with text containing strong 
presumptions in favor of parental autonomy that many grandparents 
would have difficulty surmounting.62 Although this revision may not 
have been consistent with the pro-grandparent mood reflected in the 
legislative history,63 this 1998 parent-protective statute was 
nevertheless the version favorably cited in the 2000 United States 
Supreme Court grandparent visitation case Troxel v. Granville.64 
Therefore, Campbell’s value as Utah precedent has been limited by 
Troxel, as well as by subsequent Utah Grandparent Visitation Statute 
amendments,65 and by the Utah Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.).66 
A. Campbell v. Campbell 
The ruling in Campbell seemed almost guaranteed to increase 
harm—rather than prevent harm—to children. Campbell arose after 
the death of Janet Campbell’s husband Kelly while she was pregnant 
with the couple’s fifth child.67 Despite Janet’s willingness to allow 
her children to maintain their relationships with Kelly’s parents, they 
wanted more involvement in the children’s lives than Janet believed 
she and the children could reasonably accommodate.68 The 
 
 60. Id. at 639. For example, Janet Campbell did not dispute that some visitation with 
the grandparents was in the children’s best interest. She offered a visitation schedule that she 
believed was suitable and in the best interests of her children, which was rejected by the 
grandparents and the appeals court. Without evaluating Janet’s offer for objective reasonability, 
the court refused to accept as “reasonable” an amount of visitation that grandparents could 
receive “as a matter of grace from the parent,” id., ruling instead that the statute required the 
court to make the visitation determination. Id. at 640. 
 61. See Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 64. 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000). 
 65. Pilot Program Repeal Clean-Up, ch. 129, 2005 Utah Laws 1215; Visitation Rights 
of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298; Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 265, 2000 
Utah Laws 1107. 
 66. 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083. 
 67. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 68. Id. at 637. 
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grandparents, believing their visitation requests were reasonable, 
became disgruntled over the boundaries Janet set and eventually filed 
suit under the 1993 amendment to the Grandparent Visitation 
Statute seeking a specific formal visitation schedule.69 
After initially requiring Janet to “show cause why [the 
grandparents] should not be granted reasonable visitation rights with 
their grandchildren,” the district court ordered what it considered to 
be reasonable visitation.70 After several appeals, hearings, and 
stipulated orders, the grandparents, evidently attempting to assume a 
quasi-parental role in the place of their deceased son, requested 
vastly expanded visitation rights with the children.71 This request 
intensified the district court’s “strong concerns” about the Statute’s 
constitutionality and resulted in a flurry of off-the-record 
consultations with counsel and Janet’s older children.72 
Subsequently, the district court set forth its constitutional concerns 
that the Statute infringed on parental autonomy and only issued an 
order of visitation corresponding to that which Janet had previously 
offered.73 
1. Statutory ruling on appeal 
The court of appeals analyzed the Grandparent Visitation Statute 
from both a statutory and a constitutional standpoint. On a statutory 
basis, the court of appeals rejected the district court’s finding that 
Janet’s stipulated visitation offer was “appropriate and reasonable.”74 
Instead, the court of appeals concluded that under the Statute, “the 
court’s first finding, that some visitation would be in the children’s 
best interests, [was] conclusory.”75 Noting that “[i]f court-ordered 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (granting the right to visit “every other Saturday at 9:00 a.m. until Sunday in 
time for the grandchildren to attend church” and “the right ‘to visit with the grandchildren on 
the telephone at reasonable times and under reasonable circumstances’”). 
 71. See id. at 635. This included a request for scheduled visitation every other weekend 
as well as an order for visitation near each child’s birthday, every Father’s day, one day during 
the children’s Thanksgiving holiday, three days during their Christmas holiday, a week during 
the summer, and more. Id. at 637. They also wanted the order to approve of their request for 
the children to work for the grandparents during the summers to “[assist] Janet in teaching the 
children a strong work ethic.” Id. 
 72. Id. at 638. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 639. 
 75. Id. 
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grandparent visitation were to be entirely dictated by the preferences 
of the parent, the statute would be rendered meaningless,”76 the 
court essentially held that once grandparents show that visitation is 
in the children’s best interest, the court becomes the final arbiter of 
what constitutes reasonable visitation.77 The mother’s visitation offer 
was not considered for objective reasonability; rather, the court 
outlined the following factors to consider in making a reasonable 
award of visitation under the Statute: (1) the nature of the existing 
grandparent-grandchild relationship, (2) the children’s preferences, 
(3) the children’s relationships with each other and with other 
individuals with whom children interact and to whom they may be 
exposed, and (4) the fitness of all parties.78 These factors were 
presented as aids to the courts in fashioning a “reasonable” visitation 
award, not to aid them in making the initial determination as to 
whether visitation was in the children’s best interest and should be 
ordered over the parent’s wishes.  
The appellate court held that making the state the proper judge 
of these factors, rather than the parent, did not “substantially 
infringe upon the parent’s fundamental rights or the autonomy of 
the nuclear family” and that only a statute granting “unrestricted 
vested right[s] of visitation” in the grandparents would raise 
constitutional concerns.79 The court did require, however, that 
grandparents bear the burden of proof to show that visitation was in 
the children’s best interest, rather than requiring the parent to show 
why visitation was not in the children’s best interest.80 Additionally, 
the appellate court instructed the district court to make findings that 
a visitation order would not unduly interfere with the parent-child 
relationship.81 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 640. 
 79. Id. at 642–43. 
 80. Id. at 643. While the Campbell court heralded this burden shifting as sufficiently 
parent-protective, the court in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.) acknowledged that 
grandparent proof of “best interests” alone is no longer constitutionally adequate post-Troxel. 
2006 UT 46, ¶ 26 n.4, 144 P.3d 1083. 
 81. See Campbell, 896 P.2d at 644. 
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2. Constitutional ruling on appeal 
From a constitutional standpoint, the court of appeals held that 
the Statute passed constitutional muster on three bases: first, 
constitutionally protected family relationships include grandparents 
and other family members;82 second, the Statute passes a rational 
basis review;83 and third, the state has a greater reason to interfere 
with family autonomy when the “nuclear family has been 
dissolved.”84 
The district court’s conclusion that the parent-child relationship 
is the only relationship given constitutional consideration in our 
society was rejected by the appellate court.85 Citing Prince v. 
Massachusetts86 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland87 as examples of 
constitutionally protected extended family relationships, the court of 
appeals essentially disregarded the parental “liberty interest . . . [in] 
child-rearing autonomy” by stating that any protection of that 
autonomy is a mere byproduct of “the [Supreme] Court’s larger 
concern with privacy rights of the family.”88 Therefore, as long as 
state intervention to preserve family relationships broader than the 
parent-child relationship was not unduly burdensome, it was found 
to be constitutionally permissible.89 
Second, the court of appeals approved the district court’s finding 
that the Statute “compromise[d] and encroached upon and is in 
some ways detrimental to the relationship of authority, control, and 
custody provided by the natural situation.”90 However, because the 
appellate court interpreted the constitutional protection of families as 
going beyond parent-child or quasi-parent-child relationships to 
include extended family relationships, it only required a rational basis 
standard of review for grandparent visitation cases.91 And since the 
 
 82. See id. at 643. 
 83. Id. at 643–44. 
 84. Id. at 640 n.9. 
 85. Id. at 639. 
 86. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 87. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 88. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 641 n.12. 
 89. Id. at 642. 
 90. Id. at 640 n.10. 
 91. See id. at 642. 
SCHOFIELD.MRO.COM 1/23/2007 2:16:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1684 
Statute only authorized “reasonable” visitation, the appellate court 
found such visitation to be rationally related to the state’s interest.92  
By its own prerogative, the appellate court determined that the 
state’s interest was to encourage extended family members, such as 
grandparents, to play an “important role in the lives of their 
grandchildren”93 and to “promote intergenerational contact and 
strengthen the bonds of the extended family” given the 
“disintegration of the nuclear family” occurring with regularity in 
society.94 Further, the Statute was found to be reasonably related to 
these hypothesized state purposes, since the Statute did not 
“presume that grandparent visitation was necessarily in the children’s 
best interest,” but required grandparents to demonstrate “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that court-ordered visitation [was] in 
the children’s best interest.”95 
Third, the court of appeals rejected the district court’s 
conclusion that deferring to reasonable parental decisions served the 
public policy interest,96 and, therefore, the State should not infringe 
“upon a parent’s right to raise his or her children” without a 
showing of parental unfitness unreasonably “expos[ing] the children 
to danger.”97 Instead, the appellate court simply concluded that 
despite the fundamental liberty interest parents have to raise their 
own children,98 “the state has a stronger argument for court 
intervention to protect the extended family when the nuclear family 
has been dissolved.”99 The resulting “judicial oversight” required to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law “explicitly 
demonstrating that the best interests of the children will be served by 
granting visitation” was thus considered adequate to protect the 
“integrity of the family.”100 
The court of appeals’ constitutional analysis was flawed, resulting 
in Campbell’s reduced precedential importance and, more 
importantly, lessening the Grandparent Visitation Statute’s 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 643. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 639. 
 97. Id. at 640. 
 98. Id. at 641. 
 99. Id. at 640 (quoting Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 580 n.10 (Tenn. 1993)). 
 100. Id. at 643. 
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effectiveness at balancing the harms facing children who are the 
subject of grandparent visitation disputes. 
3. Flaws in the Campbell analysis 
Three flaws in the appellate court’s constitutional analysis 
resulted in an inappropriate statutory interpretation. The flaws 
include: (1) an overly broad conception of constitutional protection 
for extended families, (2) an arguably incorrect hypothesis about the 
Statute’s purpose, and (3) a failure to accord a fit single parent the 
same constitutional protection as parents in an intact family. 
 
a. An overly broad conception of constitutional protection for 
extended families. First, the court’s use of Prince and Moore to 
support constitutionally protected extended family relationships 
failed to consider that in those cases, the extended family members 
were acting in loco parentis toward the children at issue.101 Prince 
involved an aunt who was the custodian of her nine-year-old niece, 
whose health and safety the court considered at risk as a consequence 
of street tracting.102 This risk of harm to the child justified state 
intervention in the quasi-parent-child relationship to prohibit the 
street tracting.103 Prince does not support the contradictory 
proposition of the Campbell court that extended constitutional 
protection to broader family member relationships, because those 
relationships are not all parental or quasi-parental relationships, as 
was the case in Prince.104 
Moore, in a similar manner, involved a boy living with his then-
custodial grandmother after the death of his mother.105 His presence 
in the apartment violated a family housing ordinance that the court 
found unconstitutional because it impermissibly restricted the 
definition of family by excluding extended family households.106 The 
Supreme Court in Moore spoke of providing constitutional 
 
 101. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 n.16 (1977); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 160–63 (1944). 
 102. Prince, 321 U.S. at 160–63. The aunt and the niece were Jehovah’s Witnesses who 
distributed religious pamphlets on city streets. Id. at 161. 
 103. Id. at 169–70. 
 104. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642–43. 
 105. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 n.16. 
 106. Id. at 505. 
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protection for a “larger conception of the family”;107 however, that 
language must be judged in the context of the case’s facts. This was a 
grandmother in a quasi-parental relationship with her grandson. The 
grandmother was essentially the boy’s guardian after his mother’s 
death—sharing the same household was a protective circumstance in 
this case that the child’s mother would undoubtedly have welcomed 
and approved. It was a questionable stretch by the Campbell court to 
apply Moore’s “larger conception of the family” language to 
constitutionally protect a grandparent-grandchild relationship 
without similar compelling circumstances and in the face of parental 
opposition. Arguably, expanding constitutional protection for 
extended family relationships in very factually different grandparent 
visitation cases will result in state intrusion that constitutes the undue 
burden forbidden by the court of appeals under rational basis 
review.108 
 
b. An arguably incorrect hypothesis about the statute’s purpose. The 
court of appeals hypothesized that the legislative purpose for the 
Grandparent Visitation Statute was to “promote intergenerational 
contact and strengthen the bonds of the extended family”109 by 
permitting grandparents to play an “important role in the lives of 
their grandchildren.”110 The court of appeals offered no evidence to 
support its expansive and sentimental interpretation of the Statute’s 
purpose. Instead, the origin and history of the Statute suggest that 
its purpose was limited to protecting children from the harm of 
losing established and significant extended family relationships upon 
the death or divorce of a parent.111 Further, this interpretation of the 
Statute’s purpose is also more consistent with broader state family 
law doctrines112 and with constitutional principles that permit state 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642 (stating that heightened scrutiny is required when “state 
interference ‘interfere[s] substantially’ or ‘heavily burden[s]’ fundamental rights”). 
 109. Id. at 643. 
 110. Id. at 642 (citing Moore, 431 U.S. 494).  
 111. Yet even state intervention to prevent harm was not necessary in the Campbell case, 
where the children were in no significant danger of losing their extended family relationships. 
 112. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-102 (2003) (discussing abuse, dependency, and 
neglect proceedings); Id. § 30-3-5 (2003) (discussing visitation upon divorce). The principles 
underlying these statutes serve to protect children from harm while preserving parental rights 
to the fullest extent possible. These doctrines have little to no focus on promoting the desires 
of adults at the expense of children. 
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intervention into family life when necessary to protect children from 
harm.113 
The court of appeals’ decision is at odds with United States 
Supreme Court decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska,114 Pierce v. Society of 
the Sisters,115 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,116 which all represent a long-
standing constitutional doctrine that protects parental decision-
making from state interference where the parents’ decisions are not 
“inherently harmful.”117 And—although the general evolution of 
visitation doctrine in Utah has tended to equate the parental role 
with the status and relationship roles of non-parental visitation 
petitioners—as seen earlier,118 the court of appeals did not analyze or 
discuss whether this equation is constitutionally accurate. In fact, in 
the absence of a quasi-parental role played by a grandparent, the 
parent-child relationship does receive constitutional protections that 
are unavailable to the grandparent-grandchild relationship, as the 
United States Supreme Court indicated when it decided Troxel.119 
Moreover, the court of appeals’ hypothesized purposes make the 
Grandparent Visitation Statute both under- and over-inclusive; the 
Statute does not apply to grandparents of children in intact families 
who seek to play an “important role” in the lives of their 
grandchildren, nor does it foster “intergenerational contact” 
between grandparents and grandchildren when it would be in the 
child’s best interest but the grandparent is simply not interested in 
participating. While a rational basis review does not require such 
congruence, a review under a heightened standard does. And since 
the parent-child relationship is a fundamental liberty protected by 
the Constitution,120 the court of appeals should have applied a 
 
 113. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. 494; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 114. 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (recognizing that parents have the right to decide to 
have their children taught the German language because it “is not injurious to the health, 
morals or understanding” of the children). 
 115. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (refusing to interfere with parents’ decision to send their 
children to private schools rather than public schools because there was no evidence the 
children would be harmed by private school attendance). 
 116. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (refusing to compel Amish parents to educate their 
children in public schools rather than receive an Amish education because an Amish education 
would not be harmful to the children). 
 117. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. 
 118. See supra Part II.B. 
 119. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000); see also infra Part IV. 
 120. The parent-child relationship is protected under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
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heightened standard of review, under which the court’s hypothesized 
purpose for the Grandparent Visitation Statute would not have 
survived. 
Finally, the court of appeals’ grandparent-centered conception of 
the Statute’s purpose makes it far more likely that courts will find 
grandparent visitation to be in the children’s “best interest” and 
result in an intrusive visitation order the court finds “reasonable.” 
Under the appellate court’s conception, grandparents stand on 
essentially equal constitutional footing with parents. This concept 
fails to consider that parents have obligations and responsibilities to 
both the child and the state that are not shared by extended family 
members. This consideration alone makes the court’s expansive 
hypothesis about the Statute’s purpose inappropriate to justify state 
intervention in parental decisions. 
 
c. Failure to accord a fit single parent the same constitutional 
protection as parents in an intact family. The third flaw in the 
Campbell court’s analysis is its constitutional conclusion that “the 
state has a stronger argument for court intervention to protect the 
extended family when the nuclear family has been dissolved.”121 This 
conclusion was based on dicta found in a footnote in Hawk v. Hawk, 
the case that struck down Tennessee’s grandparent statute as 
unconstitutional because it did not require a showing of harm to the 
children if grandparent visitation were not ordered.122 The holding in 
Hawk actually required a two-part analysis prior to an order of 
visitation: (1) an initial showing of harm to the child, and only then 
(2) a consideration of whether the “best interests of the child” 
support a visitation order.123 
In order to be consistent with its holding, Hawk’s dicta124 must 
logically only apply to the second part of its analysis—nuclear family 
breakdown as a factor to consider in the best interest analysis. The 
Campbell court used it out of context to justify state intrusion on 
single parent autonomy for the benefit of adult extended family 
members rather than to benefit children who may suffer significant 
harm caused by dissolving family relationships. Further, the 
 
 121. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Hawk v. 
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 580 n.10 (Tenn. 1993)). 
 122. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580–81. 
 123. Id. at 580. 
 124. Id. at 580 n.10. 
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Campbell court failed even to apply the Hawk dicta to the facts of its 
case: it promoted extended family relationships at the expense of a 
widowed mother’s authority, even when her husband’s death did not 
place the children at any risk of losing their relationships with their 
father’s extended family. 
 
d. Other flaws in Campbell. In addition to the above, the 
Campbell decision was flawed because it increased the likelihood that 
children would be harmed by court-ordered grandparent visitation. 
Sociological studies and anecdotal evidence of parental visitation 
orders on divorce reveal that court-ordered visitation is intrusive and 
often harmful for all parties involved, including the children it was 
intended to protect.125 The justification for state intrusion despite 
this harm in cases of divorce is largely based on the parents’ co-equal 
rights and responsibilities as well as the child’s greater need for a 
continuing relationship with both parents. 
With grandparent visitation outside of a quasi-parental setting, 
the grandparents’ rights and responsibilities are not co-equal with 
the parents’; therefore, the only justification for an intrusive visitation 
order is when the harm created by such an order is outweighed by 
the harm to a child that would result without an order. When 
determining visitation “reasonability” when the parties do not have 
equal rights and responsibilities, the Campbell court’s grandparent-
centered interpretation fails to consider the inherent harms of 
visitation orders. 
B. Legislative Incorporation of Campbell into the 1998 Amendment 
As a result of the court of appeals’ pro-grandparent decision in 
Campbell, the Utah legislature voted to expand the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute in 1998 to “keep adults letting adults in[to] the 
lives of children.”126 Sponsored by nearly half of the House 
 
 125. See generally Nolan, supra note 4, at 281–88. Visitation orders result in a multitude 
of issues between often hostile parties that require ongoing court intervention, such as (1) the 
duration, location, logistics, and possible supervision of visits; (2) modification orders as 
circumstances change, relocation problems, and the potential impact of multiple visitation 
orders; as well as (3) parental sanctions for violation of a visitation order. Id. at 269; see also 
Newman, supra note 4, at 21. 
 126. Utah House Floor Debate (Audio Recording), 52d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 26, 
1998), http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=1998GS&Day=39&Bill=& 
House=H (statement of Rep. Buffmire). 
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membership127 and abandoning a focus on preventing harm to 
children, the bill added a new section to the Statute which gave 
standing to seek grandparent visitation to all grandparents, not just 
those whose child had died or been divorced.128 
In doing so, however, the legislature acknowledged one 
important check on state intrusion into parental autonomy provided 
by the Campbell decision.129 This check required that grandparents 
bear the burden of proof to show that visitation was in the best 
interest of the children rather than by requiring the parent to show 
why visitation was not in the children’s best interest.130 This was 
referred to by the legislators as presuming parents’ “basic interests,” 
and the amendment went on to outline five factors grandparents 
could use to rebut the presumption that a parent’s grandparent 
visitation decision was reasonable.131 
However, these “basic interests” were only protected for certain 
parents. The legislature apparently noted Campbell’s holding that 
state intrusion on parental decision-making authority was appropriate 
as long as a family was not intact, even when children were at no risk 
of harm from the loss of extended family relationships. This is true 
because the original statutory language in section 1 was retained, 
which “grant[ed] grandparents reasonable rights of visitation, if it is 
 
 127. House Bill 136 (Grandparents Visitation Rights) was sponsored by twenty-eight 
representatives. See An Act Relating to Grandparents; Expanding the Rights of Grandparents 
to Seek Court-Ordered Visitation, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 130. Id. at 643. While the Campbell court heralded this burden shifting as sufficiently 
parent-protective, the court in Thurgood acknowledged that grandparent proof of “best 
interests” alone is no longer constitutionally adequate post-Troxel. See Uzelac v. Thurgood (In 
re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 26 n.4, 144 P.3d 1083. 
 131. An Act Relating to Grandparents; Expanding the Rights of Grandparents to Seek 
Court-Ordered Visitation, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361. The factors were as follows: 
(a) [visitation] is in the best interest of the grandchild; (b) the petitioner is a fit and 
proper person to have rights of visitation with the grandchild; (c) the petitioner has 
repeatedly attempted to visit the grandchild and has not been allowed to visit the 
grandchild as a direct result of the actions of the parent or parents; (d) there is no 
other way for the petitioner to visit the grandchild without court intervention; and 
(e) the petitioner has, by clear and convincing evidence, rebutted the presumption 
that the parent’s decision to refuse or limit visitation with the grandchild was 
reasonable. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(e) (1998). 
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in the best interest of the grandchildren” for grandparents whose 
children had died or been divorced.132 
By retaining this language and making section 1 independent, 
the amendment subjected children whose parents had died or 
divorced to the same Grandparent Visitation Statute interpreted 
under Campbell. This meant that without any consideration of the 
potential harm faced by children, the court would determine a 
“reasonable” visitation award under a very expansive statutory 
purpose favoring grandparents as long as grandparents showed by a 
preponderance of the evidence that visitation was in the best interest 
of the child.133  
For children in intact families, however, the 1998 amendment 
established a presumption in favor of the parent’s decision to limit or 
refuse visitation. It gave grandparents the burden of proving both 
that visitation was in the best interest of the children and that the 
parent’s decision was unreasonable by “clear and convincing” 
evidence134 rather than by Campbell’s mere “preponderance of the 
evidence.” 
Additionally, this section of the amendment reflected Campbell’s 
factual underpinnings as well as its holdings in three of the factors 
grandparents could use to establish that visitation was in the child’s 
best interest and that the parent’s visitation decision was 
unreasonable:135 (1) the grandparent seeking visitation must be a “fit 
and proper person,” (2) the grandparent must have repeatedly 
attempted and been disallowed visitation with the children, and (3) 
only a court order will result in parental compliance with 
grandparent visitation requests.136 Had these factors been applied in 
Janet Campbell’s case, it is unlikely that the court would have 
overridden Janet’s reasonable visitation offers.137 
The United States Supreme Court favorably cited this newly 
amended section of Utah’s 1998 statute in its landmark grandparent 
 
 132. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(1). 
 133. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642–43. 
 134. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(e). 
 135. Daren G. Mortenson, Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 703, 
797. 
 136. An Act Relating to Grandparents; Expanding the Rights of Grandparents to Seek 
Court-Ordered Visitation, ch. 104, § 30-5-2(2)(b)–(d), 1998 Utah Laws 361. 
 137. Janet had never prohibited her children’s visits with their paternal grandparents, so 
court intervention was not the only way for the grandparents to see their grandchildren. 
SCHOFIELD.MRO.COM 1/23/2007 2:16:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1692 
visitation case Troxel v. Granville.138 Additionally and significantly, in 
Troxel the Supreme Court applied a nearly identical presumption 
favoring the grandparent visitation decision of a single mother whose 
children’s father had died.139 This suggests that the decision of the 
district judge respecting a widowed mother’s visitation decision in 
Campbell was more constitutionally accurate than the decision of the 
appellate court and that the legislature’s reliance on Campbell to 
apply a far lesser standard of proof to non-intact families was 
constitutionally infirm. Nonetheless, while the Troxel opinion was 
pending, the legislature attempted to go one step further than the 
Campbell decision and erode even the parental presumptions 
favoring intact families. 
C. The Ill-Timed 2000 Amendment 
Of all the Grandparent Visitation Statute amendments the Utah 
legislature had passed to date, the 2000 amendment was the least 
parent-protective and the least focused on preventing harm to 
children. Despite Troxel pending before the United States Supreme 
Court, sponsors in the legislature proposed a bill that would have 
eliminated the parental presumption of reasonableness in all cases 
except those where the nuclear family remained intact.140 
The proposed bill would have allowed a court to override any 
parent’s grandparent visitation decision based on its own 
determination of “the best interest of the grandchild.”141 After 
legislative review noted that the bill raised constitutional concerns 
about parental autonomy, and because the Troxel case was pending 
before the United States Supreme Court,142 the legislature rejected 
this language and considered several modifications. Eventually, the 
 
 138. 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000). 
 139. 530 U.S. at 68. 
 140. An Act Relating to Grandparents; Clarifying Grandparents’ Standing to Bring an 
Action in District Court; and Removing the Statutory Presumption Regarding a Parent’s 
Decision, S. 166, 53d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2000), available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/ 
~2000/htmdoc/Sbillhtm/SB0166.htm (including bill as originally proposed). The author’s 
survey of cases available for review in Lexis-Nexis indicates that grandparent visitation cases 
involving intact families remain the minority of cases. Furthermore, with Campbell as 
precedent, it is arguably true that had this amendment passed, even intact nuclear families 
would have been at risk for routine rebuttal of the parental presumption. 
 141. Id. 
 142. The legislative history for Utah Senate Bill 166 can be found at http:// 
www.le.state.ut.us/~2000/bills/sbillamd/SB0166.pdf. 
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enacted amendment defined a “grandparent” with standing to 
petition for visitation to include biological grandparents, adoptive 
grandparents, and persons whose child, by marriage, is the parent of 
the grandchildren—presumably step-grandparents.143 Additionally, it 
eliminated the “clear and convincing evidence” standard required for 
a grandparent to rebut the parental presumption of reasonability.144 
By expanding the number of adults with standing to seek 
visitation while eliminating the heightened standard for rebutting a 
parent’s visitation decision, the amendment disregarded parents’ 
rights and increased the likelihood that children would be harmed by 
becoming the focus of visitation battles. Yet, during the minimal 
legislative floor debates on this amendment, no legislator expressed 
any concern about respect for parental autonomy.145 One legislator 
mischaracterized the amendment as merely providing courts with the 
ability to consider a grandparent’s bonded relationship with a 
grandchild in cases of death or divorce.146 But the legislature had 
already authorized courts to consider bonded relationships with 
grandparents in cases of death and divorce since at least 1977.147 
Two other legislators made emotional appeals in support of the 
bill, the first supporting the amendment as a means to prevent 
grandparents from being “punished along with the children” when 
the parents of the grandchildren undergo a divorce.148 The second 
appeal, which was representative of the general legislative mood 
during floor debate on this bill, extolled the virtues of “extended 
families in dealing with the nurturing and upbringing of children” 
and stated that the bill “highlights the importance” of the “vital role 
of grandparents”149 (language remarkably similar to that employed 
 
 143. Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 265, § 3, 2000 Utah Laws 1107. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Utah House Floor Debate (Audio Recording), 53d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 28, 
2000), http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2000GS&Day=0&Bill=SB0166 
S01&House=H [hereinafter 2000 Floor Debate]. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See Grandparents’ Visitation Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566 (allowing 
grandparents, defined as persons whose child—deceased or divorced—is the parent of the child 
with whom visitation is being sought, to sue at law for visitation rights). 
 148. 2000 Floor Debate, supra note 145 (statement of Rep. Bilrey). 
 149. Id. (statement of Rep. Harper). 
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by the court in Campbell).150 The legislature was apparently heavily 
weighted in favor of grandparents’ interests; before the final vote was 
taken on the bill, thirty-eight senators, in a jovial atmosphere, 
registered “conflicts” to the bill by proudly announcing that they 
were grandparents or grandparents-to-be.151 
This legislative history reveals that not only were the provisions 
of the easily passed 2000 amendment not well understood, but that 
no consideration was given to the important interests at stake for 
parents and children. Consequently, Utah law after Campbell and the 
post-Campbell amendments subjected even reasonable parental 
decisions about grandparent visitation to scrutiny and potential 
overturn by a court in every case where death or divorce impacted a 
family. For all other families, fit grandparents who provided evidence 
of repeatedly limited or denied attempts to visit their grandchildren, 
even if reasonably limited or denied, were likely to obtain a visitation 
order by persuading a court by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence that visitation was in the grandchild’s best interest. 
This is due to Campbell’s instruction for courts to interpret the 
Statute in light of the state’s interest in promoting the “important” 
role of grandparents,152 making it more likely that a court would find 
visitation to be in a child’s best interest. This, in turn, would be 
enough to rebut the parental presumption. Fortunately for parents 
and children, the Campbell interpretation and the 2000 amendment 
were severely undermined when the United States Supreme Court 
released its decision in Troxel v. Granville, which while not requiring 
a heightened harm standard, permits and may even encourage one. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF TROXEL V. GRANVILLE ON UTAH’S 
GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE 
Troxel v. Granville placed important limitations on state 
grandparent visitation statutes to protect families from the harm of 
violating parents’ fundamental liberties in the “care, custody, and 
control of their children . . . .”153 The Supreme Court’s decision 
 
 150. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (“[G]randparents 
are members of the extended family whom society recognizes as playing an important role in 
the lives of their grandchildren . . . .”). 
 151. 2000 Floor Debate, supra note 145. 
 152. See Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642. 
 153. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
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impacted grandparent visitation statutes in all fifty states, and many 
state statutes have been amended or judicially reinterpreted after 
Troxel.154 
Utah’s statute has been similarly impacted by Troxel. After 
Troxel, a 2002 amendment to the Statute reinstated the presumption 
of reasonableness in favor of all parents’ visitation decisions and 
suggested that courts consider the possibility that a denial of 
visitation might harm the child when determining whether the 
grandparents have rebutted that presumption.155 Additionally, a 
recent Utah Supreme Court decision that awarded grandparent 
visitation emphasized a district court’s finding that a denial of 
visitation rights would harm the particular child in question.156 
A brief discussion of the Troxel opinions is necessary to 
appreciate the impact they had on the Campbell holding, the 2002 
amendment, and the Thurgood holding. This section will then 
consider Utah’s post-Troxel amendments, which incorporate Troxel 
and certain Campbell holdings into the 2002 Grandparent Visitation 
Statute. These amendments render the current Statute facially 
compliant with both federal and state constitutional precedents and 
arguably establish, as a practical matter, that grandparent visitation 
orders will not be made without a showing that the child would be 
harmed by a denial of visitation.157 
Troxel v. Granville involved the challenge of a Washington 
statute permitting “any person” at “any time” to petition for 
visitation rights with a child under a “best interests” standard.158 
Tommie Granville, a woman who never married the father of her 
two daughters, contested the statute when the paternal grandparents 
became unhappy with the frequency and duration of visitation 
Granville offered them after the father committed suicide.159 The 
father’s parents, the Troxels, had established a relationship with the 
girls during the father’s twice-monthly custodial weekends prior to 
his death and on a similar basis for some months after his death.160 
 
 154. See infra Part VI.C. 
 155. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298. 
 156. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083. 
 157. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298. 
 158. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.10.160(3) (1994)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 61. 
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However, after Granville married and established a new family unit, 
she informed the Troxels that she would prefer that the girls visit 
only once per month.161 The Troxels objected to this limitation, filed 
suit under the Washington statute, and the court eventually awarded 
them additional visitation against Granville’s wishes.162 
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute 
was an unconstitutional infringement on parental autonomy because 
it permitted the state to intervene with fundamental parental rights 
without a showing of harm to the child if the state did not 
intervene.163 It also held that the statute was overbroad, permitting 
any person at any time to force the parents to undergo judicial 
review of their decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of 
their children.164 This decision was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court.165 
A. Troxel’s Constitutional Requirements 
Troxel was a 4+1+1-3 decision, with the four Justices making up 
the plurality opinion declaring the statute unconstitutional as the 
statute was applied to Ms. Granville and her children.166 Two of the 
three dissenting Justices similarly dissented on a statutory basis.167 
The remaining Justices wrote concurring or dissenting opinions 
specifically on the basis of constitutional reasoning and 
interpretation.168 Because the decision has no majority opinion and 
many Justices wrote separate opinions, the holding of the Court in 
Troxel is complicated and warrants careful analysis. 
The plurality in Troxel declined to invalidate grandparent 
visitation statutes in all fifty states on a per se basis. Rather, the 
plurality discussed missing statutory elements that could render state 
grandparent visitation statutes constitutional.169 These elements 
included limits on third party standing to subject parental visitation 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 63. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 73. 
 167. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 93 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion). 
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decisions to state court review170 and “special weight” or deference 
to be granted to the parent’s visitation decision.171 It was in this 
context that the Court favorably cited Utah’s 1998 statute for 
establishing a presumption in favor of the parent’s visitation decision 
that could only be rebutted by “clear and convincing evidence.”172 
Additionally, statutes may constitutionally consider the parent’s 
fitness to make a visitation decision.173 Whether the grandparents had 
previously been offered a reasonable amount of visitation may also be 
a consideration.174 
Justice Stevens dissented from this enumeration of statutory 
factors that would render state grandparent visitation statutes 
constitutional.175 He objected to even considering a statute’s 
constitutionality before an appeals court had determined the 
adequacy of the trial court’s findings.176 He further argued that the 
“best interest” standard alone is not necessarily unconstitutional, 
particularly when other persons have an established relationship with 
the child that justifies limiting parental autonomy.177 Citing Michael 
H. v. Gerald D. as an example,178 Justice Stevens argued that parental 
interests could appropriately be limited when necessary to consider 
the independent interest of the family.179 
Justice Scalia’s dissent essentially abdicated from the 
constitutional debate because parental rights are not enumerated in 
the Constitution and because Washington’s grandparent visitation 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 70. 
 172. Id. at 70 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(e) (1998)). 
 173. Id. at 67. 
 174. Id. at 71. 
 175. Id. at 82–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 86–87. 
 178. Id. at 87 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)). 
 179. Id. at 87–88. However, this is not an apt comparison since the holding in Michael 
H. prevented an outsider (a biological parent, no less) from disrupting a nuclear family, 
whereas in Troxel, a nuclear family was being disrupted by a nonparent. See Michael H., 491 
U.S. at 124. Further, Michael H. involved competing parental claims from men both willing to 
undertake the responsibilities and rights of fatherhood, whereas Troxel involved a contest 
between a parent and an extended family member who was not seeking parental rights and 
responsibilities but merely rights without responsibilities. See id. at 126–27. 
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statute was enacted by duly elected representatives.180 Thus, he 
would have simply upheld the statute.181 
The two concurring opinions by Justices Thomas and Souter 
concurred with the plurality in affirming the Washington Supreme 
Court’s invalidation of the state’s grandparent visitation statute, but 
they did so on a constitutional, rather than a statutory, basis.182 
Justice Thomas’s opinion strongly supported parental autonomy as a 
fundamentally privileged right. Since parents have a fundamental 
right to “direct the upbringing of their children,” Justice Thomas 
argued that any state intervention should be subject to “strict 
scrutiny” before “second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding 
visitation with third parties.”183 
Justice Souter observed that the Washington Supreme Court’s 
decision was consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior 
precedent protecting fundamental parental rights from state 
intervention and found that no further delineation of the precise 
scope of the parents’ rights or protections was necessary.184 However, 
he did imply that another factor may be relevant: whether an existing 
substantial relationship with the child deserves protection.185 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent, based on constitutional grounds, also 
suggested that legitimate and established relationships, especially 
parent-like relationships, should be protected even over the parents’ 
objection.186 However, he was not certain that the “best interest” 
test provided sufficient constitutional protection for parental 
autonomy.187 He was also the only Justice to point out that 
grandparent visitation litigation itself may be so disruptive to parents 
that the parents need constitutional protection.188 
 
 180. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile I would think it entirely 
compatible with the commitment to representative democracy set forth in [our] founding 
documents to argue, in legislative chambers or electoral campaigns, that the State has no power 
to interfere with parents’ authority over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that the 
power which the Constitution confers on me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws 
that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) an unenumerated right.”). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 75–80 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 183. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 184. Id. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 185. Id. at 77. 
 186. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 101. 
 188. Id. 
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Due to the complexity of the separate opinions in the Troxel 
decision, the following table summarizes the positions of the 
members of the Court regarding the necessary factors for state 
grandparent visitation statutes to pass constitutional muster: 
 
Factors Plurality 
 
Souter 
 
Thomas 
 
Stevens 
 
Scalia 
 
Kennedy 
 
Broadness 
limited 
Yes  
By 
implication 
  Yes 
Deference 
to parent’s 
decision 
Yes Yes 
By 
implication 
  Yes 
Parental 
fitness 
Yes  
By 
implication 
  Yes 
Denial of all 
visitation 
requests 
Yes      
Requires a 
showing of 
harm to 
child 
Didn’t 
reach 
Didn’t 
reach 
Probably
—strict 
scrutiny 
No  
Covered 
in “best 
interest” 
Established, 
substantial 
relationship 
protected 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Changed 
circum-
stances 
     Yes 
Child’s 
preferences 
considered 
   Yes   
Broader 
definition of 
“family” 
protected 
   Yes   
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Factors Plurality 
 
Souter 
 
Thomas 
 
Stevens 
 
Scalia 
 
Kennedy 
 
More 
weight to 
state’s 
parens 
patriae 
powers 
against 
arbitrary 
parental 
decisions 
   Yes   
Parental 
protection 
from 
litigation 
     Yes 
  
As can be seen, there was strong support for the first three 
factors addressed in the plurality opinion (broadness of standing 
limited (6-3), deference to the parent’s decision (7-2), and parental 
fitness to make a visitation decision (6-3)). Constitutionally 
protected third-party visitation with children in substantial, 
established relationships against the parent’s wishes did not receive 
majority support (3-6), a fact that may have significance in related 
visitation decisions pending in Utah courts.189 
The most significant question in Troxel for the purposes of this 
Comment is the one that was not really answered: whether a 
showing of harm to the child without a visitation order is required 
before grandparent visitation may constitutionally be ordered against 
the parent’s wishes. Justice Stevens expressly rejected this 
requirement,190 and, at the other extreme, Justice Thomas implicitly 
required nothing short of harm to overcome a strict scrutiny 
analysis.191 The remaining Justices may have discussed—but 
ultimately did not require—a statutory harm element because the 
 
 189. See, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, No. 20040932 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2005). In this 
case, the former lesbian partner of the biological mother of a three-year-old child was granted 
parental status and visitation by a district court judge. Id. On appeal, the mother challenges 
both the parental status determination and the third party visitation order. Id. 
 190. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Constitution’s silence about parental rights made this factor fall 
within an acceptable constitutional range that, as related to domestic 
law, is best determined by individual state legislatures.192 Several 
Justices expressed concern about the Troxel decision ushering in 
federal family law, an area of regulation historically and appropriately 
left to the states.193 As discussed below, the Utah legislature chose to 
include a harm factor in its post-Troxel amendment, a fact that was 
given due consideration in the Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Grandparent Visitation Statute in Thurgood.194 
B. Campbell as Precedent After Troxel: Incorporation of Campbell 
and Troxel into the 2002 and 2005 Amendments 
Troxel halted the swift expansion of grandparent and other third-
party visitation rights in many states, including Utah. Courts and 
legislatures were now required to carefully consider parents’ 
fundamental rights and were advised to more carefully consider the 
impact of grandparent visitation statutes on children. Key portions of 
Utah’s Campbell case were effectively overruled, and the Utah 
legislature amended the Grandparent Visitation Statute to reflect 
Troxel considerations, including the fact that grandparents may need 
to show that the child would be harmed without a visitation order.195 
Troxel invalidated Campbell’s conclusion196 that courts have the 
prerogative to determine reasonable grandparent visitation and that a 
court’s decision supersedes the visitation decision made by a fit 
 
 192. Id. at 73 (plurality opinion); id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 93 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 73 (plurality opinion) (explaining that whether any specific grandparent 
visitation statute violates the Constitution depends on how it is applied and that “[b]ecause 
much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be 
hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a 
per se matter.”); id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is indisputably the business of the States, 
rather than a federal court employing a national standard, to assess in the first instance the 
relative importance of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as this.”); id. at 93 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I think it obvious—whether we affirm or reverse the judgment here  
. . . that we will be ushering in a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, 
family law.”); id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The protection the Constitution requires, 
then, must be elaborated with care, [and] we must keep in mind that family courts in the 50 
States . . . are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues that arise.”). 
 194. See infra Part V.B. 
 195. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, § 30-5-2(2)(d), 2002 Utah Laws 298. 
 196. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 639, 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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parent under a “best interest” standard.197 Troxel clearly rejected 
state interference that amounts to little more than substituting a 
judge’s visitation decision for a fit parent’s visitation decision when 
there are no factors that rebut the parental presumption of 
reasonability.198  
Further, Troxel rejected Campbell’s suggestion199 that the state 
can intervene with a lesser showing of deference when the nuclear 
family is dissolved.200 Troxel afforded the same parental presumption 
to the visitation decision of Tommie Granville, an unwed mother 
whose nuclear family was not intact, as it required states to afford to 
all other parents.201 Therefore, Troxel effectively overruled 
Campbell’s conclusion that “promot[ing] intergenerational contact 
and strengthen[ing] the bonds of the extended family” are enough 
justification for the state to intrude on parental autonomy regardless 
of whether the family is intact.202 However, before any Utah 
appellate-level grandparent visitation cases arose after Troxel to 
confirm these conclusions about Campbell, the Utah legislature 
amended the Grandparent Visitation Statute.203 
Following Troxel’s favorable citation to Utah’s parent-protective 
1998 statutory provisions, the Utah legislature recognized that the 
ill-timed 2000 amended statute “did not give proper deference to 
the opinions of parents regarding the issue of grandparent 
visitation.”204 Accordingly, in a much more somber legislative 
atmosphere than existed when the 2000 amendment was passed,205 
the legislature revised the Statute in 2002 to reflect Troxel’s holding 
that “parents are the proper ones to raise children” and are presumed 
 
 197. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 72–73 (plurality opinion). 
 198. Id. at 72–73 (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the 
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge 
believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”). 
 199. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 640 n.9 (quoting Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 580 n.10 
(Tenn. 1993)). 
 200. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69–70 (plurality opinion). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 643. 
 203. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298 (amending sections 
30-5-1 and 30-5-2 of the Utah Code). 
 204. See Utah House Floor Debate (Audio Recording), 53d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 27, 
2002), http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2002GS&Day=0&Bill=SB0087 
S01&House=H (statement of Rep. Urquhart). 
 205. See id. 
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to “act in the child’s best interest.”206 The new Statute contained a 
presumption in favor of parents’ decisions that grandparents may 
only rebut based on factors defined by the amendment.207 It 
therefore appears clear that the legislature intended the new 
amendment to protect parents’ fundamental rights and obligations 
to make decisions regarding when and with whom their children may 
visit. At the same time, the amendment provided a means unavailable 
at common law for grandparents to override a parent’s unreasonable 
visitation decision when necessary for the children’s welfare.208 
In the process of enacting the 2002 amendment, the legislature 
considered an initial bill that proposed emphasizing the “special 
weight” to be accorded to a parent’s decision.209 However, after 
several revisions and a bill substitution, the amendment restored 
language similar to the favorably cited 1998 statute presuming that 
“a parent’s decision with regard to grandparent visitation is in the 
grandchild’s best interests.”210 The 2002 amendment also 
incorporated all of the Troxel plurality’s statutory guidelines into its 
factors by which the parental presumption may be rebutted.211 It 
limited broadness by allowing only grandparents to seek visitation 
under the statute212 and only against the parent’s wishes in defined 
circumstances that require the court to make findings.213 A fit and 
competent parent’s decision was granted deference.214 And, it 
posited that when a fit parent offers some amount of visitation to the 
grandparent, the court must make other significant findings before 
overriding the parent’s decision as unreasonable.215 
 
 206. Id. The remainder of the House floor discussion on this amendment consisted solely 
of one representative relating the unhappy experience of a constituent parent who had had very 
little influence or recourse when a court ordered grandparent visitation, against her wishes, to 
her child’s paternal grandmother, a woman convicted on several drug charges and whose son 
was currently in jail for committing two public shootings and an additional shooting while on 
probation. Id. (statement of Rep. Wallace). 
 207. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(g), 2002 Utah Laws 
298. 
 208. Id. 
 209. S. 87 Substitute, 2002 Gen. Sess., at line 50 (Utah 2001), available at http:// 
www.le.state.ut.us/~2002/htmdoc/sbillhtm/sb0087s1.htm. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See supra Part IV. 
 212. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, § 30-5-2(1), 2002 Utah Laws 298. 
 213. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(g). 
 214. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(c). 
 215. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(g). 
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In addition to incorporating the Troxel plurality’s statutory 
guidelines, the factors discussed in the Troxel concurrences and 
dissents are also represented in the statute. The 2002 amendment 
provides that the court may consider an established, parent-like 
relationship as a factor in deciding whether to override a parent’s 
unreasonable visitation decision.216 Most importantly, the Utah 
legislature chose to require courts to consider whether the children 
would be harmed without a visitation order.217 Finally, even some of 
Campbell’s standards are represented in the amendment, such as 
consideration of the nature of the existing relationship and the 
fitness of all parties.218 In summary, the current statutory provisions, 
as amended in 2002, are presented below, with the apparent source 
noted in brackets: 
(a) The petitioner is a fit and proper person to have visitation with 
the grandchild [Campbell, 1998 statute, Troxel]; 
(b) Visitation with the grandchild has been denied or unreasonably 
limited [1998 statute, Troxel]; 
(c) The parent is unfit or incompetent [Campbell, Troxel]; 
(d) The petitioner has acted as the grandchild’s custodian or 
caregiver, or otherwise has had a substantial relationship with the 
grandchild [Campbell, Troxel], and the loss or cessation of that 
relationship is likely to cause harm to the grandchild [Troxel]; 
(e) The petitioner’s child, who is a parent of the grandchild, has 
died, or has become a noncustodial parent through divorce or legal 
separation [1977 statute]; 
(f) The petitioner’s child, who is a parent of the grandchild, has 
been missing for an extended period of time [new]; 
 or 
 
 216. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(b), (d). 
 217. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(d). 
 218. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(a), (d); see Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 640 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
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(g) Visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild [Common to 
all previous versions, Campbell, and Troxel].219 
In addition to the Campbell holdings that survived Troxel and 
were incorporated into the current amendment, three other 
Campbell factors survived and appear to remain good law in Utah. 
First, courts may continue to consider the preferences of the children 
as well as the children’s relationships with each other and others to 
whom they will be exposed,220 factors that Campbell instructed 
courts to consider once it determined that a visitation order was 
appropriate.221 Second, courts must still make findings that a 
visitation order would not unduly interfere with the parent-child 
relationship.222 
Third, without making any substantive changes to the 2002 
statute, the 2005 Grandparent Visitation Statute amendment 
repealed the parental sanctions provision established in the 1993 
amendment under pilot program section 78-32-12.2,223 presumably 
leaving the court free to use its other remedial powers against parents 
in contempt of a visitation order.224 
The calculus of which of these 2002 statutory factors carries the 
most weight in individual grandparent visitation cases was an issue of 
substantial concern to the Utah Supreme Court in Thurgood.225 
However, the Statute’s final provision, which authorizes grandparent 
visitation rights when “visitation is in the best interest of the 
grandchild,” is clearly no longer sufficient justification alone for a 
visitation order.226  
After many efforts by both courts and legislators to strike an 
appropriate balance between the competing interests of children, 
parents, and grandparents, the parent-child relationship in Utah is 
currently guarded by special statutory protections, at least in the 
context of grandparent visitation cases. These protections recognize 
 
 219. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 220. See, e.g., Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 5 n.1, 144 
P.3d 1083. 
 221. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 640. 
 222. Id. at 639. 
 223. See Grandparents’ Rights Extended, ch. 175, 1992 Utah Laws 676. 
 224. Pilot Program Repeal Clean-Up, 2005 Utah Laws 1107 (codified as amended at 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 2005)). 
 225. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 29–32. 
 226. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(g). 
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the fundamental interest parents have in the care, custody, and 
control of their children, and they presume that parents act in the 
best interest of their children regarding grandparent visitation 
decisions. Nevertheless, upon a showing of sufficient countervailing 
factors by clear and convincing evidence, grandparents can rebut the 
presumption that the parent’s decision is reasonable and in the best 
interest of the child.227 Grandparents who meet this stricter standard 
are still able to obtain state assistance to gain visitation in order to 
prevent harm to their grandchildren.228 
V. TESTING TROXEL’S IMPACT: DO UTAH’S POST-TROXEL 
DECISIONS PROPERLY DEFER TO A FIT PARENT’S DECISION WHEN 
THE CHILD WOULD NOT BE HARMED ABSENT AN ORDER? 
A review of grandparent visitation decisions in Utah appellate 
courts after Troxel reveals that the amendments to the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute are probably not clear enough to protect parents’ 
fundamental interests in raising their children or to focus courts’ 
attention on preventing harm to children. Since Troxel, one Utah 
grandparent visitation case has been decided based on the 1998 
statute,229 and a second case was recently decided in the Utah 
Supreme Court under the 2002 statute.230 
In the first case, Pasquin v. Souter, the court found no evidence 
that the child would be harmed without a visitation order, so it 
deferred to the parent’s visitation decision, an interpretation of the 
1998 Grandparent Visitation Statute that is consistent with Troxel.231  
The second case, Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), was 
an as-applied constitutional challenge to the Utah Grandparent 
Visitation Statute.232 The Utah Supreme Court correctly found the 
revised 2002 statute constitutional under Troxel but admitted that 
 
 227. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2). 
 228. It is important for courts, legislators, and grandparent visitation advocates to 
remember that those grandparents who cannot meet this standard still have resources—albeit 
old-fashioned ones—for increasing the likelihood that their visits with their grandchildren will 
be encouraged and welcomed: kindness, cooperation, and respect for the parent’s role and 
decision-making, combined with being of true assistance to both the parent and the children.  
 229. Pasquin v. Souter, No. 970910481 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. July 8, 2001) (mem.), aff’d 
mem., 2003 UT App 10. 
 230. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46.  
 231. See Pasquin, No. 970910481. 
 232. 2006 UT 46. 
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legislative guidance on the application of the statute’s factors would 
be helpful to ensure that judges properly balance the competing 
demands involved in grandparent visitation cases.233 The court’s as-
applied decision in this case concluded that the lower court’s 
grandparent visitation order did not infringe upon parental liberty 
interests.234 However, the court’s application of the Statute in this 
case is evidence that without further legislative guidance, particularly 
regarding the Statute’s harm factor, grandparent visitation in Utah is 
still more likely to cause greater harm to children than it prevents. 
A. Pasquin v. Souter: A Visitation Order Denied 
Utah’s first post-Troxel grandparent visitation case upheld a fit 
single mother’s decision to completely deny grandparent 
visitation.235 Pasquin v. Souter required the court to apply the 1998 
statute to a petition by a grandmother who requested visitation with 
her deceased son’s child against the mother’s (Ms. Souter’s) 
wishes.236 The dispute over visitation was the result of a rocky 
relationship between the mother and the grandmother.237 While the 
grandmother had previously had a meaningful relationship with her 
grandchild, she had only had minimal contact with the child for 
three years prior to her son’s death.238 The grandmother filed a 
petition for visitation under the Statute so that she could teach her 
granddaughter about her father’s life and preserve his memory, 
stating she was “best equipped to accomplish this and eager to 
start.”239 The mother objected to visitation in part because the 
grandmother planned to have the child associate with other children 
fathered by her deceased son in other nonmarital relationships.240 
The court’s memorandum decision noted that although the 
1998 Grandparent Visitation Statute only required a “best interest” 
analysis in cases of death or divorce of the grandparent’s child,241 
after Troxel, courts must analyze each of the statutory factors when 
 
 233. Id. ¶ 36. 
 234. Id. ¶ 43. 
 235. Pasquin, No. 970910481. 
 236. Id. at 3. 
 237. Id. at 4. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 3. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 2. 
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considering visitation petitions by all grandparents.242 Therefore, 
despite the 1998 statute’s contrary language and the Campbell 
precedent on record, the court interpreted both the statute and 
Campbell to constitutionally require all grandparents to rebut the 
presumption of parental reasonability by clear and convincing 
evidence.243 This standard was implied by the court’s declaration that 
“it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a parent’s reasonable 
decision to deny a grandparent visitation with a child would be 
contrary to the child’s best interests.”244 The trial court reviewed the 
facts of the case and ruled that the record “contain[ed] facts 
sufficient . . . to conclude that the best interests of [the child were] 
best served by deferring to decisions made by her mother concerning 
visitation with the [grandmother].”245 The mother refused all 
visitation at that time.246 On appeal, the decision was upheld.247 
Pasquin demonstrates that a post-Troxel Utah court 
interpretation of the Grandparent Visitation Statute followed 
Troxel’s requirement for courts to presume that a fit parent’s 
decision is in the child’s best interest, even when a single parent 
denied all visitation to a fit grandparent. The court’s decision notably 
did not include a Campbell analysis; thus, Campbell appears to have 
had little to no precedential influence. Instead, the most significant 
statutory factor appears to have been the lack of any current, 
ongoing relationship between the grandmother and the grandchild 
despite there having been a previously existing relationship, 
indicating that the child would probably suffer no harm from losing 
the relationship by deferring to the mother’s decision. 
Unfortunately, Pasquin is a district court memorandum decision 
with limited precedential influence on higher state courts.248 
Nevertheless, it is a good example of deference to a parent’s 
visitation decision under Troxel and suggests that when a visitation 
 
 242. See id. 
 243. Id. at 2–3. 
 244. Id. at 2. 
 245. Id. at 3. 
 246. Id. at 5. 
 247. Pasquin v. Souter, 2003 UT App 10 (mem.). 
 248. This is true even in the unusual situation presented by Pasquin, which was decided 
in the Third District by the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, now of the Utah Supreme Court, 
who concurred in the Thurgood decision that affirmed a grandparent visitation order against a 
fit father’s wishes. 
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order may create greater harm to the child than it will prevent, 
grandparent visitation is appropriately denied. 
B. Thurgood: Failure To Properly Defer, or a Sufficient Showing of 
Harm that Justifies Overriding a Fit Parent’s Visitation Decision? 
In contrast to Pasquin, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a 
grandparent visitation award in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of 
S.T.T.), a recent high-conflict case.249 This decision may delineate 
what the court considers to be a sufficient showing of harm to justify 
overriding a fit parent’s visitation decision. Alternatively, the court 
may have failed to properly defer to the parental presumption by 
Troxel standards before applying the Grandparent Visitation Statute’s 
rebuttal factors. In either case, the decision is troubling and suggests 
that the Statute should be amended to require a heightened showing 
of harm so that the competing needs and interests of children, 
parents, and grandparents are more appropriately balanced.250  
1. History of the case 
The Utah Supreme Court began its Thurgood opinion with a 
truncated and grandparent-centered recital of the facts. This is a 
reflection of its focus on the rebuttal factors of the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute rather than on any factors relevant to first 
upholding the constitutionally-required presumption that the 
parent’s decision was in the child’s best interest.251 The decision fails 
to either include or analyze facts relevant to whether the father’s 
visitation decision was reasonable and should have been granted 
deference because it could be presumed to be in his child’s best 
interest. Therefore, this Section begins by presenting additional 
 
 249. 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083. 
 250. Unless the statute is amended, Thurgood will likely have significant precedential 
effect. It has already garnered significant media attention heralding grandparent rights. See 
Geoffrey Fattah, Grandparent-Visit Ruling Is Praised, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Aug. 26, 
2006, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,645196283,00.html. This 
article contains numerous factual errors, but it garnered enough attention statewide that even 
the court’s case file on Thurgood contains a letter from a Utah attorney referencing it and 
requesting a copy of the case because of the hope it gave grandparents. See also Pamela Manson 
& Jeremiah Stettler, Grandparent Visitation Rights Upheld, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 26, 2006, 
available at http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci_4242203; Utah Court Upholds Grandparent 
Visitation Rights, KUTV, Aug. 26, 2006, http://kutv.com/topstories/local_story_238181 
300.html. 
 251. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 1–12. 
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background of the Thurgood case as identified in the appellate record 
and in a previous court of appeals decision.252 
This case began in 2000, when a father, Darryl Thurgood, 
disputed visitation rights sought by his daughter’s maternal 
grandmother, Darlene Uzelac.253 Mr. Thurgood and his wife 
divorced in 1994; after a brief reconciliation, their child was born in 
December 1995.254 From 1996 to 1999, the mother and child lived 
with the maternal grandparents while the mother worked in the 
grandparents’ home-based real estate business.255 Because of this 
living situation, the grandparents had daily contact and interaction 
with the child.256 They continued to have frequent contact with the 
child after she and her mother moved into their own home in 
February of 1999.257 
In 2000, when the child was four years old, the mother died 
unexpectedly from a short illness, leaving instructions with the 
maternal grandmother to apply for guardianship of the child in 
contravention to Mr. Thurgood’s parental rights.258 For a two-
month period, the grandmother did not notify Mr. Thurgood of the 
mother’s death; instead, she moved into the child’s home to care for 
her while her petition for custody and guardianship of the child was 
being considered by the court.259 
Mr. Thurgood learned of his ex-wife’s death in the newspaper.260 
At that time, the grandmother refused to relinquish his daughter, 
and he was forced to file an action to gain physical possession and an 
appointment of guardianship over his child.261 The court awarded 
him temporary custody in June 2000 as “the natural father” with 
“absolute parental rights.”262 The final order of February 2001 made 
Mr. Thurgood’s custody of his daughter permanent, noting that he 
 
 252. See generally Thurgood v. Uzelac (In re S.T.T.), 2003 UT App 439, 83 P.3d 398; 
Appellate Record, Thurgood, 2006 UT 46 (No. 20040796) (on file with the Utah Supreme 
Court, Salt Lake City, Utah) [hereinafter Appellate Record]. 
 253. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 3–12. 
 254. Id. ¶ 3. 
 255. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 1046; see also Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 4. 
 256. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 3. 
 257. Id. ¶ 4. 
 258. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 30. 
 259. Id.; Thurgood v. Uzelac (In re S.T.T.), 2003 UT App 439, ¶¶ 2–3, 83 P.3d 398. 
 260. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 2. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. (citing trial court minute entry of September, 2000). 
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was a fit parent and that Ms. Uzelac’s petition for custody failed.263 
Nonetheless, the court recommended “some future visitation” 
between the grandmother and child, subject to the father’s 
approval.264 However, no specific visitation order was made. 265 
During this adjustment period, as Mr. Thurgood attempted to 
reestablish his own parent-child relationship with his daughter, he 
permitted three one- to two-hour visits and numerous phone calls 
between the maternal grandparents and his daughter over a nine-
month period.266 According to filings in the record, Mr. Thurgood 
was unhappy with these interactions.267 He alleged that the 
grandmother was attempting to manipulate the child’s affections and 
undermine his relationship with his daughter by showering her with 
wrapped gifts, which the child opened during the grandmother’s 
visit at Mr. Thurgood’s home, and then packing up the toys in the 
trunk of her car and telling the child that she could play with them 
when she came to live at the grandparents’ home.268 Additionally, 
Mr. Thurgood alleged that the grandmother was not acting in his 
daughter’s best interest by withholding approximately $4000 of his 
daughter’s Social Security survivor’s benefits that the grandmother 
obtained after the child was removed from her custody.269 
The record also reveals that after Ms. Uzelac’s petition to take 
custody of the child was denied, she amended it to seek a visitation 
order.270 Her counsel submitted a hearing brief in May 2001 arguing 
that Utah’s 2000 Grandparent Visitation Statute was constitutional 
under the newly decided Troxel case and that visitation should be 
ordered because Mr. Thurgood “has cut his daughter off from 
visitation with her grandparents.”271 Mr. Thurgood objected and 
 
 263. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 500. 
 264. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 3 (quoting trial court order of February 7, 
2001).  
 265. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 705.  
 266. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 6, 144 P.3d 1083; 
Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 177–78. 
 267. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 176–81. 
 268. Id. at 178–79. 
 269. Id. at 771 (transcript of Hearings on Motions, Jan. 9, 2003, p. 16). 
 270. Id. at 703. 
 271. Id. at 349. Additionally, the brief asked the court to order visitation according to 
“the directives of . . . Campbell v. Campbell.” Id. As shown in Part III.A.3 and Part III.C., it is 
questionable whether either the 2000 statute or Campbell would have passed constitutional 
muster under Troxel. 
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filed a constitutional challenge to the 2000 Grandparent Visitation 
Statute that was heard in the Third District Court in June 2001.272 
In July, the court ruled that the 2000 statute was constitutional 
under Troxel, and that despite Mr. Thurgood’s fitness as a parent, 
the court could determine grandparent visitation “based solely upon 
question of best interests of the minor granddaughter.”273 The court 
informed Mr. Thurgood that he had “invited” the court’s 
intervention into his visitation decisions by divorcing the child’s 
mother, and that the death of the child’s mother had “created a 
situation where the court should consider the issue of visitation 
between [the grandmother] and the child.”274 
At the grandmother’s request, the court ordered a visitation 
evaluation by a “duly qualified evaluator,” after which a trial on 
visitation issues would occur near the end of 2001.275 While these 
issues were pending, no order of visitation was put in place, and Mr. 
Thurgood chose not to respond to Ms. Uzelac’s repeated demands 
for visitation.276 Unsatisfied by the response to her demands, Ms. 
Uzelac filed a motion for a temporary order of visitation in April 
2002.277 
In June 2002, apparently without a hearing of any kind, the 
court ordered temporary grandparent visitation beginning with two 
hours of supervised visitation and increasing over a period of time to 
one unsupervised weekend visit each month.278 This order coincided 
with Mr. Thurgood’s then six-year-old daughter’s summer vacation 
from school, and Mr. Thurgood spent a month during that vacation 
traveling with her in Australia shortly after this order was made.279 
When he returned in August, during a time when he was 
unrepresented by counsel,280 Ms. Uzelac had obtained a court order 
granting her a schedule of stepped-up visitation culminating in 
 
 272. Id. at 498. 
 273. Id. at 500. This surprising ruling makes one wonder if the court had read the Troxel 
case, which clearly forbade courts from ordering visitation solely upon “best interests,” absent 
consideration or even a mention of deference to a fit parent’s wishes. See Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000). 
 274. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 500.  
 275. Id. at 500–01. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Thurgood v. Uzelac (In re S.T.T.), 2003 UT App 439, ¶¶ 1–2, 83 P.3d 398. 
 278. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 540. 
 279. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 4. 
 280. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 549. 
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visitation one weekend per month to continue until trial.281 For two 
months, Mr. Thurgood did not comply with this order, and five 
scheduled weekend visits were missed.282  
In October, Ms. Uzelac filed a motion seeking a contempt order 
against Mr. Thurgood for “violations” of this visitation order.283 The 
court found Mr. Thurgood in contempt, sentenced him to sixty days 
in jail, and informed him that the only way to stay the jail sentence 
was for him to deliver his daughter to Ms. Uzelac for visitation every 
other weekend throughout the pendency of the case.284 
In the face of this looming jail sentence and as his child’s only 
surviving parent in an ongoing battle with a woman who had 
previously sought to take guardianship of his child away from him, 
Mr. Thurgood appeared to have little choice but to comply with the 
visitation order. He duly delivered his daughter to Ms. Uzelac for 
twice-monthly weekend visits from January to December 2003, 
while appealing the contempt order to the Utah Court of Appeals.285 
Mr. Thurgood argued that the trial court abused its discretion 
because the Utah Code provides that the penalty for violations of 
visitation orders can consist of a statutory maximum jail sentence of 
only thirty days and make-up visitation only in an amount that 
remedies the lost visitation.286 The Utah Court of Appeals agreed 
with Mr. Thurgood and reversed the contempt order because the 
trial court had abused its discretion by sentencing Mr. Thurgood to 
sixty days of jail time and by awarding Ms. Uzelac vastly increased 
visitation.287 However, the Utah Court of Appeals refused to 
consider Mr. Thurgood’s claims about the trial court’s initial errors 
in awarding visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Statute.288 
In January 2004, following this December 2003 decision by the 
court of appeals, Mr. Thurgood and his eight-year-old daughter 
moved to Florida.289 Prior to moving, Mr. Thurgood filed with the 
 
 281. Id. at 545–47. 
 282. See id. at 545, 561. The court’s order for every other weekend visitation was dated 
August 23, 2002, meaning that by October 21, the date of Ms. Uzelac’s motion, Mr. 
Thurgood would have missed five scheduled visitation weekends. 
 283. Id. at 561. 
 284. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 5; Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 400.  
 285. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 5; Appellate Record, supra note 252. 
 286. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶¶ 13, 14. 
 287. Id. ¶ 14. 
 288. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 401–02. 
 289. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 6, 144 P.3d 1083. 
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court an appropriate notification of his intent to move.290 The notice 
proposed an offer of grandparent visitation to include three days at 
Christmas, four days in the summer, twice-weekly phone calls, and 
visits in Florida for two to three days at a time (including overnight 
visits) at the father’s approval.291 This offer was apparently rejected, 
and there is no indication in any subsequent hearing or decision that 
Mr. Thurgood’s offer was ever considered by the courts as evidence 
that Mr. Thurgood was willing to offer some amount of reasonable 
visitation to the grandparents.  
Ms. Uzelac’s visitation evaluator presented her formal findings of 
the child’s attachment to her grandparents to the court on January 
19, 2004—almost immediately after Mr. Thurgood’s move to 
Florida—even though the evaluation had been conducted four 
months earlier.292 Additionally, Ms. Uzelac spoke by telephone to 
the child in February 2004, after which the record reveals no further 
visitation or telephone calls.293 
The trial on the issue of grandparent visitation was held in Utah 
on July 28, 2004. Mr. Thurgood was represented by two attorneys, 
though he did not attend himself.294 At the trial, Ms. Uzelac offered 
as conclusive the testimony of her visitation expert.295 The visitation 
expert’s report to the court concluded that the petitioning 
grandparents were fit and proper persons to have visitation with the 
child, that the child was warmly attached to her grandparents, and 
that the child particularly enjoyed being in the home with toys and 
clothes she remembered having during the time her mother was 
alive.296 This expert further testified that the child “[kept] the 
memory of her mother alive via her access to the maternal 
 
 290. Id.; Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 868.  
 291. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 869. 
 292. Appellate Record, supra note 252 (including information from pages 1 and 4 of the 
Grandparent-Grandchild Assessment). The evaluator’s visit occurred in the Uzelacs’ home 
during one of the child’s 2003 visitation weekends, although the visit was not a “traditional 
formal visitation evaluation” typically requested by courts when making visitation 
determinations. Id. 
 293. The grandmother claimed that she called and left messages at least three times 
weekly for several months. Handwritten Log by Grandmother, Thurgood, 2006 UT 46 (No. 
20040796). The father argued that he complied with all applicable Orders—the one regarding 
telephone contact expired on March 1, 2004. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 901. 
 294. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 1045.  
 295. Id. at 1049. 
 296. Appellate Record, supra note 252 (including information from pages 4 and 6 of the 
Grandparent-Grandchild Assessment). 
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grandparents,” that she “[was] strongly attached” to the Uzelacs, 
and that she would “suffer” if deprived of the relationship.297 The 
expert therefore opined that “frequent and on-going visitation” with 
the maternal grandparents would be in the child’s best interest.298 
The court subsequently ordered grandparent visitation to occur 
every fifth weekend within one hundred miles of the child’s home in 
Florida (unless a holiday weekend intervened, in which case the child 
would spend it with her father), ten days during the summer 
vacation, and telephone contact for a minimum of thirty minutes 
each Wednesday at seven o’clock in the evening—as well as at any 
other time the child wished to call her grandparents.299 Mr. 
Thurgood appealed the order, claiming that the Utah Grandparent 
Visitation Statute was unconstitutional as it was applied to him.300 
He claimed that the courts had never deferred to his visitation 
decisions regarding “who, when, and where third parties [were] 
going to be permitted visitation with his daughter”301 despite “no 
prior ruling that [he was] an unfit parent.”302 The court granted a 
stay of the visitation order while Mr. Thurgood’s challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Statute was pending.303 
2. Constitutional ruling on appeal 
The Utah Supreme Court correctly concluded that the current 
amended version of Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute was 
constitutional after Troxel.304 It began its constitutional analysis by 
acknowledging that parents have a constitutional right to make 
decisions concerning the “care, custody, and control of their 
children” and that those decisions are entitled to deference under the 
presumption that they are “in the best interests of their children.”305 
 
 297. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 1051–52. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 1053–54. 
 300. Id. at 704. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 500. 
 303. Id. at 1069. 
 304. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 36, 144 P.3d 1083. 
 305. Id. ¶ 13. The court discussed the following cases from 1923–2000: Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923). 
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However, the court then emphasized that the state may 
legitimately “limit parental autonomy in raising children” when its 
parens patriae interests were implicated.306 It contended that a state’s 
parens patriae interest was implicated when a child’s parents 
divorce,307 when custody of a child is at issue,308 and when a child has 
formed relationships with non-parental third parties.309 The court 
also cited numerous state grandparent visitation statutes, including 
Utah’s, as evidence that grandparent-grandchild relationships are 
among those third-party relationships that implicate a state’s parens 
patriae power.310 
Then, in support of its conclusion that Utah’s current 
Grandparent Visitation Statute was constitutional, the court reviewed 
the plurality’s holdings in Troxel.311 According to the court, Troxel 
(1) rejected a “‘best interest’ standard as the only limiting factor” to 
 
 306. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 14. The court supported this assertion by citing to the 
following United States Supreme Court cases that upheld state interference with parental 
autonomy to protect children from harm: Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) 
(terminating parental rights after due process hearing in cases of abuse and neglect); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 1158 (1944) (upholding a state law prohibiting an aunt from allowing 
her nine-year-old niece to street tract at a busy intersection); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) (requiring child education); and Sturges & Burn Manufacturing Co. v. Beauchamp, 
231 U.S. 320 (1913) (prohibiting youth from working in hazardous occupations). 
 307. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 15 (citing Utah’s divorce statute). 
 308. Id. The court discussed Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), which notes that 
courts grant custody to one parent over another based on the best interests of the child. 
 309. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 15–16. The court cited Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 
635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), which approves state intervention to foster grandparent-
grandchildren relationships when it would be in the children’s best interest, and Gribble v. 
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), which recognizes that some “relationships beyond those of 
parent-child may be important enough to protect vis-à-vis visitation,” id. at 66, in that case, a 
stepparent relationship upon divorce, id. at 65. Using these citations to justify the state’s 
parens patriae intervention to promote third-party visitation in a child’s best interest seems 
somewhat inapposite because Campbell, as discussed in Part IV.B., was essentially overruled 
after Troxel, and Gribble was not truly a third-party visitation case, but a case between the 
divorcing parent/stepparent of the child. 
 310. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 15–16 & n.2. The court also presented a truncated 
review of the history of Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. Unfortunately, 
the review did not take into consideration the limited purposes of its original enactment or 
address the early experimentation between broad and narrow approaches to the statute that the 
legislature settled in favor of a narrow formulation prior to judicial involvement in Campbell in 
1995. The court essentially jumped from the 1977 original statute to the 2005 amended 
statute without commenting on the intervening debate and concluded that “the statute favors” 
grandparents of grandchildren whose parents have died or been divorced. Id. ¶ 17. 
 311. Id. ¶¶ 19–24. 
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a grandparent visitation award,312 (2) required “proper deference to 
the parental presumption” of a fit parent,313 and (3) noted that 
“special weight” was to be afforded to a fit parent’s grandparent 
visitation decision.314 
The Utah Supreme Court also correctly recognized that 
constitutionally acceptable statutes were likely to contain provisions 
deferring to the presumption that fit parents’ visitation decisions 
were in their children’s best interest.315 Further, where visitation was 
limited or denied, the court also recognized that a statute requiring a 
finding that the parent was acting unreasonably “would be more 
likely to be upheld.”316 
The Utah Supreme Court then applied the Troxel holdings to 
Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute to determine whether it was 
constitutional.317 First, it presumed without comment that the 
Statute met Troxel’s first requirement that third-party visitation 
statutes not be overly broad.318 The court made this presumption 
because Utah’s statute gives standing only to grandparents and notes 
that the timing of visitation petitions are limited and governed by the 
Statute.319 
Next, the court noted that section 30-5-2(2) met the 
prerequisite of deference to a parent’s visitation decision by requiring 
courts to presume that fit parents’ visitation decisions are in the best 
interests of their children.320 The court then engaged in a lengthy 
discussion about the various statutory factors by which a fit parent’s 
visitation decision may be rebutted.321 The court broke down these 
rebuttal factors into three general categories: One that addresses 
situations where a child’s interests may differ from the parent’s, one 
that addresses harm a child may suffer without a visitation order, and 
one that identifies necessary threshold findings. This Comment will 
discuss the court’s interpretation of these groupings in comparison 
 
 312. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)). 
 313. Id. ¶¶ 20, 23. 
 314. Id. ¶¶ 22, 23. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. ¶ 23. 
 317. Id. ¶¶ 27–37. 
 318. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000). 
 319. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(1) (2005). 
 320. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 27. 
 321. Id. ¶¶ 29–35. 
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to Troxel. Then, a review of the Thurgood court’s as-applied decision 
will discuss how these factors were inappropriately applied, and 
therefore indicate a need for better legislative clarification of the 
Statute. 
 
a. Differing interests. The first category of factors in Utah’s 
Grandparent Visitation Statute to be identified by the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized that divisions in the primary family, for whatever 
reason, may result in situations where the interests of children may 
be different from the interests of parents.322 The court saw a greater 
likelihood that situations in which the “‘in-law’ relationship [was] 
the only remaining adult connection”323 would create circumstances 
where parents’ interests may differ from children’s interests, resulting 
in unreasonable parental visitation decisions that are not in the 
child’s best interest.324 The court anticipated that such parent 
visitation decisions would receive heightened scrutiny to determine 
their reasonability.325 
Because the Utah Supreme Court predicted that parents in intact 
families were less likely to have interests that conflicted with the best 
interest of their children, it was careful to point out that visitation 
decisions by parents in intact families would likely be upheld.326 
 
b. Harm without a visitation order. The second category 
addressed statutory factors indicating that a child may be harmed 
unless the court intervenes with a visitation order.327 Interestingly, 
this set of factors was characterized by the court quite differently 
than it was in Troxel. The first factor emphasized by the Utah 
 
 322. Id. ¶ 30. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See id. ¶ 30 & n.6. 
 325. This is because the court presumed that the statutory factors are more likely to apply 
in divided families than in intact families. See id. ¶ 30 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-
2(2)(c), (e), (f) (2005)). However, although the court’s reasoning on this issue may be 
generally valid, it appears to have resulted in prejudging Mr. Thurgood’s visitation decision as 
presumptively unreasonable merely because the in-law relationship is the only remaining adult 
connection between the child and her grandparents. See id. 
 326. Id. ¶ 30 n.6. As a result of this declaration, Utah courts are far less likely to be faced 
with the kinds of grandparent visitation battles other states are facing—visitation disputes 
fought in typically high-conflict situations between grandparents and their own married 
children. 
 327. Id. ¶ 31. 
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Supreme Court was the child’s potential loss of a “substantial 
relationship,”328 a factor that did not receive majority support from 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel as constitutionally sufficient to 
rebut the parental presumption.329 
The second factor in this category was “denied or unreasonably 
limited” visitation,330 which would likely show that “the parent is not 
acting in the child’s best interests.”331 However, in Troxel, the court 
considered the mother’s limited offer of visitation as evidence that 
her visitation decision was not per se unreasonable.332 Since Mr. 
Thurgood’s previous visitation offer was not considered in the Utah 
Supreme Court’s as-applied decision, this suggests that the court 
may view denied or limited visitation as per se evidence that a 
parent’s visitation decision is unreasonable.333 This may not be 
constitutional under Troxel and is an important distinction because it 
emphasizes that under this factor, the reasonability of the parent’s 
decision—not what may be in the child’s best interest—is what 
courts should be examining at this stage. 
Finally, this category also includes the statutory factor addressing 
harm to the child that may occur as a result of the loss of a 
caretaking or otherwise substantial grandparent relationship.334 The 
court correctly concluded that constitutional grandparent visitation 
statutes after Troxel do not require a “showing of harm to the 
child.”335 It must be remembered, however, that Troxel left a harm 
 
 328. Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(d)). 
 329. See supra Part IV.A. Only three out of nine justices agreed that established, 
significant non-parent relationships with children should receive constitutional protection. 
 330. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(b). 
 331. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 31. 
 332. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71 (2000). Four out of nine judges in Troxel 
suggested that denied or limited grandparent visitation may be considered in the context of 
determining the reasonability of the parent’s visitation decision. Id. at 71. The plurality did 
not, as implied by the Utah Supreme Court in Thurgood, indicate that denied or limited 
visitation was per se unreasonable and, therefore, a signpost that by itself rebuts the parental 
presumption. See 2006 UT 46, ¶ 31. 
 333. This position is as untenable as the opposite extreme rejected by the court, namely, 
that a fit parent’s visitation decision can never be rebutted. See Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 24. 
Rather, “special weight” must be given to a fit parent’s “decision about whether to cultivate an 
intergenerational relationship” in the first place, id. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70), and 
satisfaction of due process requires that grandparents rebut the parental presumption by clear 
and convincing evidence, id. ¶ 28. 
 334. Id. ¶ 31 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(d)). 
 335. Id. ¶ 24. 
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requirement, in addition to numerous factors other than the basic 
elements required by due process, to the prerogative of state 
legislatures.336 Thus, while not constitutionally required to uphold 
the validity of the Utah statute, Utah’s harm factor was intended to 
be an important element in the as-applied analysis due to its 
inclusion in the legislature’s post-Troxel revised statute.337 
Unfortunately, the Statute provides no guidance as to the type of 
harm that will justify rebuttal of the parental presumption, and the 
court merely stated that the child must be “affirmatively” harmed by 
the parent’s visitation decision.338  
 
c. Necessary threshold findings. The court characterized the final 
category of statutory factors as “necessary threshold findings” 
without which the court cannot order visitation;339 namely, that the 
grandparent must be a “fit and proper person” to be awarded 
visitation340 and that all other findings notwithstanding, the court 
believes that visitation is in the best interest of the child.341 
By classifying the Statute’s rebuttal factors in this way, the court 
reiterated that the parent’s decision regarding grandparent visitation 
should never be rebutted simply because of the fitness of the 
grandparents or because visitation would be in the child’s best 
interest.342 
Using this approach, the court declared that Utah’s current 
Grandparent Visitation Statute included the necessary statutory 
factors to make it constitutional under Troxel.343 Further, the court 
made very little reference to Campbell, although it did note that the 
Statute’s expansive purpose of “fostering relationships between 
grandparents and their grandchildren” had been “narrowed 
significantly” since the version of the statute at issue in Campbell.344 
 
 336. See supra text accompanying note 194. 
 337. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 29. 
 338. Id. ¶ 33. 
 339. Id. ¶ 32. 
 340. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2) (2004). 
 341. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(g). 
 342. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 33. 
 343. Id. ¶ 35. 
 344. Id. ¶ 26 n.4 (quoting Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995)). 
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However, despite affirming the constitutionality of the 
Grandparent Visitation Statute, the Utah Supreme Court declared 
that the Statute was flawed.345 The court called upon the legislature 
to provide courts with additional statutory guidelines346 because 
giving the proper weight to each factor in an individual visitation 
decision was difficult and confusing.347 Indeed, an examination of the 
court’s application of the Statute to Mr. Thurgood reveals that the 
court’s request is not only appropriate but may be necessary to 
protect the fundamental interests at stake. In any case, how to 
protect those interests within Troxel’s flexible guidelines is a policy 
decision for the legislature, not the judiciary. The legislature should 
require grandparents to make a heightened showing of harm to the 
child before a visitation order is issued so that the competing needs 
of parents, grandparents, and children can more appropriately be 
balanced. 
2. Statutory as-applied ruling on appeal 
Unfortunately, the Thurgood court’s as-applied analysis did not 
follow its own outlined structure of factors when ruling on Mr. 
Thurgood’s constitutional complaint. It also did not start its analysis 
at the Statute’s beginning by first giving Mr. Thurgood’s visitation 
decision special weight or evaluating the reasonability of his visitation 
decision.348 Rather, the court started its analysis by examining 
whether the district court had made clear and convincing findings on 
each of the “relevant factors” in the rebuttal section of the Statute.349 
By doing so, the Utah Supreme Court appeared to treat these 
rebuttal factors more like the elements in a statutory “best interest” 
analysis, with the focus on determining whether a combination of 
factors existed that made a visitation order appropriate, rather than 
 
 345. Id. ¶ 36. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See id. ¶ 36 n.7. 
 348. Id. ¶ 39. The Utah Supreme Court simply stated that “the district court gave special 
weight to Mr. Thurgood’s decisions” by placing “the burden of proof on the grandparents to 
rebut the presumption that Mr. Thurgood’s visitation decision was in the best interests of the 
child.” Id. However, there is no indication that the district court ever considered Mr. 
Thurgood’s reasons for his denial and/or restriction of visitation to determine if they were 
reasonable or examined whether the circumstances justified his belief that he was acting in his 
daughter’s best interest. 
 349. Id. 
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on examining whether Mr. Thurgood’s visitation decision was 
unreasonable and not in his child’s best interest or whether his 
previous offer of visitation was insufficient to protect her from harm 
and thus primed for rebuttal. This application is at odds with both 
the Statute and with Troxel. 
As a result, Mr. Thurgood has been forced to undergo years of 
expensive litigation that he might have been spared if his 
constitutionally required parental presumption had first been 
examined. The time, expense, and disruption to both Mr. Thurgood 
and his daughter is exactly what Justice Kennedy warned of in 
Troxel, stating that courts may have a constitutional obligation to 
protect parents from such litigation when the disruption is severe.350 
Starting with section 30-5-2(2)(a)–(g) of the Utah Code, the 
court concluded that the district court had made findings that the 
grandparents had rebutted the parental presumption because (1) Mr. 
Thurgood’s family structure was non-intact, and the Uzelac’s 
daughter had died;351 (2) by a rote and sterile recitation of visitation 
dates, Mr. Thurgood was found to have “unreasonably” restricted 
visitation;352 (3) the child’s contacts with the Uzelacs in previous 
years constituted a “substantial relationship,” the loss of which 
“would be harmful to the child”353 based on a one-time informal 
visitation evaluation conducted in 2003 when the child was seven 
years old;354 and (4) using the statutory “best interest” factors 
identified in section 30-3-34 of the Utah Code to determine 
visitation and custody decisions between competing parents with co-
equal claims in divorce, grandparent visitation was found to be in the 
child’s best interest.355 
The Utah Supreme Court’s as-applied decision should instead 
have followed its own constitutional analysis for consistency and 
accuracy. Had it done so, the court would have begun with section 
30-5-2(2), the parental presumption of reasonability. Reviewing Mr. 
Thurgood’s decision for reasonability would likely have led the court 
to carefully review the record and acknowledge in its statement of 
the facts that from the moment of her daughter’s death, Ms. Uzelac 
 
 350. See supra Part IV.A. 
 351. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 40. 
 352. Id. ¶ 41. 
 353. Id. ¶ 42. 
 354. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. 
 355. Id. ¶ 43 & n.9. 
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began pursuing a course to undermine Mr. Thurgood as a parent. 
Had the court done so, it would not have been difficult to 
understand why a father, adjusting to the new role as sole custodian 
of his daughter, might not be overly anxious to relinquish her to a 
grandparent who actively sought to deny him that right, especially 
when, at the time, grandparent visitation was to occur at his 
discretion. 
The court would also have had to acknowledge other factors 
relevant to upholding Mr. Thurgood’s parental presumption of 
reasonability. For example, the court should have at least 
acknowledged bias in its statement that the last contact of record 
between the child and Ms. Uzelac was in February 2004. In fact, Mr. 
Thurgood had offered grandparent visitation at the time of his notice 
of intent to move.356 Further, after the trial in July 2004, the parties 
stipulated that the court’s visitation order be stayed during the 
pendency of Mr. Thurgood’s appeal, which was granted by the 
court.357 Instead, the decision omits these facts and others just as 
relevant to the reasonability of Mr. Thurgood’s visitation restrictions. 
The limited facts presented in the opinion about Mr. Thurgood tend 
to portray him as an insensitive parent willfully harming his daughter 
by callously restricting grandparent visitation.358 Whether counsel for 
Mr. Thurgood failed to argue these points or whether the court’s 
sympathies lay with the grandmother for whatever reason, relevant 
facts relating to Mr. Thurgood’s decisions were never considered in 
the court’s opinion. 
Giving Mr. Thurgood’s visitation decision “special weight” 
should at a minimum have required the court to examine his 
visitation decisions to evaluate their purpose, reasoning, and 
 
 356. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 868. 
 357. Id. at 1062 (Order Granting Motion for Stay). 
 358. These statements include the following, which are not countered by any background 
facts to explain or justify Mr. Thurgood’s decisions or point of view: After Mr. Thurgood was 
awarded sole custody of his daughter, “it became apparent that the parties could not work out 
a mutually acceptable visitation schedule.” Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 6. “Mr. Thurgood . . . 
did not allow any visitation between the child and the Uzelacs for five months. . . . Mr. 
Thurgood allowed Ms. Uzelac to spend one hour with the child.” Id. “Despite the court-
ordered schedule for visitation . . . Mr. Thurgood only allowed Ms. Uzelac to visit the child 
twice between July 2002 and January 2003.” Id. This occurred “despite repeated attempts by 
the Uzelacs to contact the child.” Id. ¶ 41. The contempt order was intended to remedy “the 
number of visits the father had prevented.” Id. ¶ 6. “The last telephonic visitation on record” 
after Mr. Thurgood moved to Florida “occurred in February 2004.” Id. “Mr. Thurgood 
terminated all phone contact between the Uzelacs and the child.” Id. ¶ 41. 
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projected progression. Had the court done so, the record would 
clearly have revealed facts that made Mr. Thurgood’s visitation 
decisions sympathetic, if not fully justified. For example, Ms. Uzelac 
failed to notify Mr. Thurgood of her daughter’s sudden death, 
forced Mr. Thurgood to seek court assistance to obtain physical 
possession of his daughter, and then fought Mr. Thurgood in court 
to obtain custody of his daughter.359 According to Mr. Thurgood, 
during the visitations that he permitted, Ms. Uzelac attempted to 
undermine his attempts to establish his own parent-child relationship 
with his daughter and manipulated his daughter’s affections by 
giving, and then withholding, material gifts.360 Mr. Thurgood 
reported financial underhandedness that made him doubt that Ms. 
Uzelac’s intentions were in the child’s best interest.361 Further, Ms. 
Uzelac has hounded Mr. Thurgood for over six years in the legal 
system, resulting in legal bills of an undoubtedly enormous amount, 
in her aggressive efforts to obtain and enforce court-ordered 
visitation.362 The statutory presumption in favor of Mr. Thurgood’s 
visitation decision was never evaluated on the basis of these or any 
other facts. 
Additionally, the court did not consider the harm that Ms. 
Uzelac was willing to impose on her granddaughter. The court 
expressed no concern that Ms. Uzelac sought and obtained a 
contempt order against her granddaughter’s only remaining parent 
for missing five visits.363 If Mr. Thurgood had resisted this order and 
served his sixty-day jail sentence as a matter of principle, his young 
daughter would effectively have lost both of her parents in a short 
amount of time. Contempt orders for missing visitation may be more 
appropriate in the context of two divorced parents with an equal 
claim to the child, but for a grandmother to guarantee visitation by 
using the threat of a jail sentence against a child’s only surviving 
parent seems absurdly harmful to the child.364 
 
 359. See supra Part V.B.1.  
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46. 
 364. This may be why these sanctions were repealed in 2005. See Pilot Program Repeal 
Clean-Up, ch. 129, 2005 Utah Laws 1215. These forces on a single parent in a grandparent 
visitation battle are nearly irresistible, as shown by Mr. Thurgood’s compliance with a visitation 
order for the entire year that it took to appeal and receive relief. 
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Further, the court did not acknowledge the harm the 
grandmother was causing to Mr. Thurgood or the child by 
constantly undercutting Mr. Thurgood’s role as a parent.365 Had 
these harms been considered, the court might have acknowledged 
that it was reasonable under these circumstances for a father to feel 
that his child’s best interest was served by temporarily creating a little 
distance from her grandmother. Mr. Thurgood did not argue that 
his decision to restrict or deny visitation was forever fixed and 
unchangeable; he merely argued that, given the history and current 
circumstances, his grandparent visitation decision deserved 
constitutional protection.366 
The harm the court did discuss in its decision was the rebuttal 
factor in section 30-5-2(2)(d), addressing the likely harm to be 
suffered by the grandchild as a result of the loss or cessation of the 
grandparent relationship.367 The court’s reliance on the visitation 
expert’s testimony368 about harm the child would suffer without a 
visitation order raises several questions about the Statute’s harm 
requirement that the legislature and courts should consider. 
In particular, what kind of harm to the child justifies a visitation 
order? Does “affirmative” harm mean anything more than “a 
specialist says so”? For example, if the evidence revealed that a child 
had successfully weathered a transition period where a visitation 
order to maintain continuity may previously have been justified, 
must a parent comply with an ongoing grandparent visitation order 
so that the child may “process” previous losses? If so, for how long? 
In Thurgood, where the child is now nearly eleven years old and there 
is no evidence in the record that she has been unable to keep the 
memory of her mother alive without visitation with her maternal 
grandparents during the pendency of the case, should the father’s 
visitation offer be superseded by the court because at some point in 
the past the child and her mother lived in the grandparents’ home? 
At what point does a cross-country grandparent visitation order 
imposed on a parent in a high conflict situation cause more harm to 
the child than it prevents? If it is true, as the court stated in Pasquin, 
 
 365. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46. 
 366. Brief for the Appellant, Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, 
144 P.3d 1083 (No. 003900606). 
 367. See Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 31 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(d) 
(2005)). 
 368. Id. ¶ 10. 
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that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a situation in which a parent’s 
reasonable decision to deny a grandparent visitation with a child 
would be contrary to the child’s best interests,”369 is state intrusion 
to order grandparent visitation justified by the showing of harm that 
has been made in this case? Do high conflict relationships between 
the parents and grandparents over prolonged, expensive litigation 
and visitation orders harm children less than the harm the visitation 
order is intended to prevent? 
Should the court consider not just the harm that may occur 
without a visitation order, but also consider how the child has been 
harmed by the grandparents’ attempts to secure visitation? In 
Thurgood, for example, the court did not appear to consider that the 
child may have been harmed by the grandmother’s refusal to inform 
the father of the mother’s sudden death or by her attempts to 
prevent the child’s access to, and bonding with, her father. 
Additionally, the court did not seem to consider that the child may 
have been harmed by knowing that her grandmother would seek to 
send her father to jail unless she visited with her grandmother. These 
questions suggest that the Utah legislature should spell out the 
relevant factors for showing harm to a child that justify a visitation 
order. By doing so, courts are more likely to balance all of the harms 
facing children as a result of grandparent visitation litigation. 
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REQUIRING A HEIGHTENED HARM 
STANDARD IN THE UTAH GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE 
There are several excellent reasons for the Utah legislature to 
amend the Grandparent Visitation Statute to require all grandparents 
to make a heightened showing of harm before authorizing courts to 
award grandparent visitation. First, grandparents—in the absence of 
special circumstances that have created a quasi-parental status toward 
the child—simply do not stand on an equal constitutional footing 
with parents; nor do they share the same obligations and 
responsibilities toward the child that the state requires of parents. As 
Thurgood demonstrated, the Statute’s constitutional protection for 
parents—the initial presumption that a parent’s decision is in the best 
interest of the child—was easily overcome as the Statute’s harm 
factor is currently formulated. 
 
 369. Pasquin v. Souter, No. 970910481, at 2 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. July 8, 2001) (mem.), 
aff’d mem., 2003 UT App 10. 
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Second, when courts order grandparent visitation, a variety of 
pragmatic challenges arise that should be considered when setting 
the appropriate standard of harm.370 Requiring grandparents to make 
a heightened showing that the child would be harmed without a 
visitation order justifies state intrusion by providing balance between 
the inevitable harms of visitation orders and the harm that an 
appropriate visitation order would prevent.371 
Third, grandparent visitation litigation places “children [at the] 
focal point of anger” between parents and grandparents.372 When 
children are asked to voice their visitation preferences, not only is 
that stressful, but they invariably end up having to choose a side. 
Although children may not understand the reasoning behind their 
parent’s decision, they are given veto power over it.373 Requiring 
grandparents to meet a heightened harm standard would spare both 
parents and children from the harm caused by the state permitting 
children to undermine the very parental authority intended to 
protect them. 
Fourth, children whose parents are divorced face special 
challenges in grandparent visitation cases because the child and the 
custodial parent may easily become subject to multiple visitation 
orders that substantially interfere with the parent-child 
relationship.374 Typically, the most important relationships for 
children to preserve in a divorce situation are their relationships with 
both parents. Requiring grandparents to make a heightened showing 
of harm would prevent visitation orders that are not essential for the 
child, leaving more time available for more critical parental 
relationships. Additionally, a heightened harm standard for 
grandparent visitation would prevent misuse of the Statute by 
grandparents primarily seeking to secure more visitation for the 
 
 370. See Nolan, supra note 4. The author thoughtfully considers numerous practical 
challenges of visitation orders and the consequences suffered by both children and parents 
when a standard other than harm determines the appropriateness of a grandparent visitation 
order. See id. Furthermore, “even if [a grandparent-grandchild bond would be beneficial to the 
child if maintained], the impact of a lawsuit to enforce maintenance of the bond over the 
parents’ objection can only have a deleterious effect on the child.” Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 
S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. 1995). 
 371. For examples of pragmatic grandparent visitation challenges, see Nolan, supra note 
4, at 269. 
 372. Newman, supra note 4, at 27–28. 
 373. Id. at 28. 
 374. Nolan, supra note 4, at 282–83. 
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noncustodial parent than authorized by the court in the parent’s 
divorce decree. 
Finally, grandparents of children in intact families should be 
required to make a heightened showing of harm to discourage 
controlling grandparents’ improper use of state authority to compel 
the behavior of their adult children.375 The policy of the state should 
be to encourage grandparents to recognize their children’s 
independence and not allow the authority of the state to be used to 
“attack . . . the parents’ status as adults,”376 so that grandparents can 
reap the rewards of intergenerational contact where they did not 
sow. By refusing to intervene in parents’ grandparent visitation 
decisions on a lesser showing of harm, the state encourages healthier 
development for children, parents, and grandparents alike.377 
Adding a heightened harm requirement to Utah’s Grandparent 
Visitation Statute raises two immediate issues: What should the 
standard of harm be, and at what point in the court’s analysis should 
it be considered? The experience of other states may be helpful to 
reveal the implications of these choices. 
A. How To Characterize a Harm Requirement 
Other states that require grandparents to make a showing of 
harm to the child before awarding grandparent visitation characterize 
this harm element in varying ways. For example, in some states the 
loss of an established relationship alone does not constitute harm to 
children.378 In others, harm is characterized as a showing that the 
child’s “health, safety, or welfare” will be significantly and adversely 
affected by the lack of a visitation order.379 Some states require a 
grandparent to have been the child’s “primary caregiver and 
custodian” for a significant period of time before the relationship 
constitutes a compelling state interest that justifies “the court’s 
 
 375. Newman, supra note 4, at 31. 
 376. Id. 
 377. See Nolan, supra note 4, at 284.  
 378. See Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (Mass. 2002); In re Parentage of 
C.A.M.A., 109 P.3d 405, 412 (Wash. 2005). 
 379. See Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1, 6, 8 (Ill. 2002) (explaning that true safety 
and welfare concerns do not include such intangibles as preserving the “child’s only connection 
to a deceased parent’s family” or arbitrary decisions based on conflict between the parent and 
the grandparent); Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1060. 
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parens patriae authority on behalf of the child.”380 An even more 
protective standard of harm would require grandparents to make a 
threshold showing of parental unfitness to make a visitation decision 
before the state may consider intervening in a grandparent visitation 
case.381 
When the Utah legislature considers amending the Grandparent 
Visitation Statute, the reasoning of the district court judge in 
Campbell is worth noting. He suggested that in the absence of a 
showing of parental unfitness that unreasonably “exposes the 
children to danger,” the State should not infringe “upon a parent’s 
right to raise his or her children,” because the public policy interest 
is enhanced by deferring to reasonable parental decisions.382 
One advantage of setting the Statute’s harm requirement at a 
high level that requires an initial showing of parental unfitness to 
make a visitation decision is that state courts are already familiar with 
parental unfitness standards in the context of custody cases and 
abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings. Another advantage of 
this standard is that children generally do better when they are 
guided, reared, and protected by the decisions of their fit parents 
than they do under state supervised orders.383 Issuing grandparent 
visitation orders, on the other hand, guarantees that many cases will 
return to the courts for ongoing state review and intervention. 
It is easy to rationalize that requiring a threshold standard of 
parental unfitness is a higher standard than necessary for a fairly 
innocuous award of grandparent visitation for a few hours several 
times a month. However, many awards of grandparent visitation are 
substantially more intrusive than that and result in significant private 
and public costs each time the state interferes in a fit parent’s child-
rearing decisions.384 Requiring grandparents to show that a parent is 
unfit to make visitation decisions before authorizing courts to 
consider whether a grandparent visitation order is in the child’s best 
 
 380. Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 302 (Me. 2000); see also Roth v. Weston, 789 
A.2d 431, 443 (Conn. 2002) (explaning that a parent-like relationship is a jurisdictional 
threshold that must be met before a court will consider a grandparent visitation petition). 
 381. See Lamberts v. Lillig, 670 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Iowa 2003); see also Polasek v. 
Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 522–23 (Mont. 2006). 
 382. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 383. See Nolan, supra note 4, at 285–87. 
 384. See generally DAN L. GOLDBERG, GRANDPARENT-GRANDCHILD ACCESS: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 41 (2003), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/pad/reports/2003 
-FCY-15E.pdf. 
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interest protects children while still providing recourse for 
grandparents in compelling situations. For grandparents unable to 
make this showing, visitation with grandchildren is merely delayed, 
either until the adults are able to work out their difficulties or until 
the children are old enough for the grandparents to approach them 
independently.385 
Alternatively, the legislature should adopt a less stringent 
showing of harm than parental unfitness but that is still protective of 
children and parents. Thurgood demonstrated that harm 
characterized as the loss of substantial relationships can be proven on 
very insubstantial grounds.386 Therefore, this standard of harm is 
probably not high enough. An intermediate standard may be to 
require grandparents to show that the grandchildren’s health, safety, 
and welfare would be harmed more without a visitation order than 
they would be if the grandchildren were subject to a visitation order. 
Under one of these alternative standards of harm, however, 
determining when this factor should come into play becomes 
important. 
B. Analysis Under an Amended Statute 
To protect parents from the burden of being unnecessarily 
required to “justify their use of parental authority,”387 any 
amendment to the Grandparent Visitation Statute should first 
require courts to make threshold findings about the fitness of all 
parties. A visitation order should never be made unless the 
grandparent is a “fit and proper person to have visitation with the 
grandchild.”388 However, unless a grandparent makes a threshold 
showing of parental unfitness to make visitation decisions, the state 
should not consider intervening to authorize grandparent visitation. 
 
 385. The experience of numerous parents and adoptees who have successfully established 
meaningful relationships after the child reached the age of majority is at least one indication 
that a loving blood connection is not forever denied to grandparents by a court’s refusal to 
interfere with parental autonomy on any lesser showing. See generally Jane E. Atkinson, 
Grandparents’ Visitation Rights: A Survey of Reciprocal Kinship-Ties Based in Historical 
Common Law and Legislative Policies, 6 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 39 (2004). 
 386. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 42, 144 P.3d 1083. 
 387. GOLDBERG, supra note 384, at 41 (quoting Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent 
Visitation, Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 393, 430 (1986)). 
 388. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(a) (Supp. 2005). 
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This is the most protective grandparent visitation analysis the 
legislature could adopt. 
Alternatively, if a less stringent showing of harm is adopted, 
whether the grandparents have met the required harm standard 
should be considered early in the statutory analysis to prevent 
unnecessary or protracted litigation. Accordingly, when a 
grandparent can show that the children’s health, safety, and welfare 
will be harmed more without a visitation order than they would be if 
they were subject to a visitation order, the court should next 
examine the visitation preferences of the parent. If the amount and 
type of visitation preferred by the parent is reasonably suited to 
prevent the harm that would be caused without a visitation order, 
the court should defer to the parent’s visitation offer. This deference 
increases the likelihood that parents will comply with the visitation 
orders and prevents the harm that would result if a child’s parent 
became subject to a contempt or jail order for visitation 
noncompliance. And, it decreases the protracted litigation that 
comes at the expense of the parent and the children.389 As a final 
check, the court still should consider whether, in light of all factors, 
visitation would be in the child’s best interest.390 
 
 389. Penalties for noncompliance with a visitation order are justified when a visitation 
order prevents harm to a child and when such a penalty protects the integrity of the court 
system. However, because the state’s power to hold parents in contempt for noncompliance 
also has the effect of harming the child, state courts should exercise restraint in issuing intrusive 
visitation orders with which parents are not likely to comply. This is a further justification for 
requiring a harm standard rather than a best interest standard. See Nolan, supra note 4, at 285–
86. 
 390. Id. Grandparents’ demands for court-ordered visitation against the parent’s wishes 
brings to mind Aesop’s fable of the contest between the wind and the sun; the illustration is an 
apt one. In that contest, the wind and the sun debated over who could remove a cloak more 
quickly from the back of a passing traveler. The wind boasted that it was so powerful and 
forceful that it could remove the traveler’s cloak whether the traveler liked it or not. However, 
upon exerting all of its power, the wind was unable to do so because the cold, biting wind 
compelled the traveler to cling desperately to his cloak. The sun, on the other hand, when 
given its turn, shone so brightly and warmly upon the traveler that in no time at all, the 
traveler released his tight grasp, unbuttoned his cloak, and finally, on his own initiative, 
removed it completely. Without a compelling case to protect a child from harm, when 
grandparents force parents to subject their parenting decisions to court review, expend large 
sums of money or acquire debt to defend their decisions, and perhaps eventually submit to a 
court-ordered schedule of visitation, they are like the fabled wind. The approach of these 
grandparents causes parents to defend their decisions and cling more tightly to their children 
than ever before. Similarly, statutory interpretations that require a lesser showing than harm to 
the child before overriding the parent’s visitation decisions simply turn state power into wind 
as well. On the other hand, statutes and case-by-case interpretations that uphold a fit parent’s 
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C. Learning from the Experience of Other States 
Reviewing a sampling of grandparent visitation cases issued by 
the highest state courts that have considered their grandparent 
visitation statutes post-Troxel is helpful to reveal the implications of 
the choices faced by the Utah legislature. For example, in some 
states, Troxel’s constitutionally mandated parental presumption may 
not be rebutted unless the child would be substantially harmed 
without a visitation order.391 Other states do not require a showing 
of harm but do give the parental presumption “special weight” or 
allow it to be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.392 
Balancing tests393 or other standards that protect parents to varying 
degrees394 are used by other states, while some have not yet taken 
action to ensure the constitutionality of their statutes after Troxel.395 
States in the Rocky Mountain area reflect this split among 
perspectives with Arizona,396 Colorado,397 Nevada,398 and New 
 
visitation decision when the child is not in danger of substantial harm without the visitation 
order are like the fabled sun. Likewise, grandparents who accept the important role of the 
child’s parent, respect the parent’s visitation decision despite their desire for greater contact 
with the child, and continue to show warmth to both the parent and the child will likely find, 
as did the sun, that patience and gentle persuasion will help them achieve their goal. 
 391. See, e.g., Richburg v. Richburg, 895 So. 2d 311 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); Roth v. 
Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002); Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2004); Brooks v. 
Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995); Lamberts v. Lillig, 670 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 2003); 
Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000); Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 
2002); Appel v. Appel, 109 P.3d 405 (Wash. 2005). 
 392. See, e.g., Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078 (Alaska 2004); McGovern v. 
McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Simmons v. Vassar-Hawk, 807 A.2d 579 (Del. 
2002); In re Visitation of C.H., 792 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Paillet, 16 
P.3d 962 (Kan. 2001); DeRose v. DeRose, 666 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. 2003); Nelson v. Nelson, 
674 N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 2004); Deem v. Lobato, 96 P.3d 1186 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004); 
Harrington v. Daum, 18 P.3d 456 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). 
 393. See, e.g., Babin v. Babin, 854 So. 2d 403 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Herrick v. Wain, 838 
A.2d 1263 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003); Barker v. Barker, 98 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. 2003). 
 394. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d 141 (Cal. 2004); Camerlingo v. 
Camerlingo, 961 P.2d 1162 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); In re Marriage of Meyer, No. C7-00-145, 
2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 882 (Aug. 22, 2000); Townes v. Manyfield, 883 So. 2d 93 (Miss. 
2004). 
 395. See Jessica Marie Beyer, Comment, Idaho’s Approach to Grandparent Visitation: 
Time for a Revision, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 155 (2003). 
 396. McGovern v. McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
 397. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006). 
 398. Steward v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777 (Nev. 1995). Steward set Nevada’s standard pre-
Troxel in a manner that did not require major statutory changes after Troxel. 
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Mexico399 requiring the parental presumption to be given special 
weight or to be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, 
Montana requires courts to first inquire into a parent’s fitness and 
then give deference to a fit parent’s decision.400 Wyoming requires a 
balancing test,401 and Idaho has not yet amended its statute since 
Troxel.402 
It is at times poignant to read court decisions where grandparent 
visitation is denied because of a state’s higher harm standard.403 In 
most cases, it is impossible to know whether the parents and the 
grandparents eventually settled their differences and resumed more 
ordinary interaction between the grandparents and the 
grandchildren. On the other hand, a review of state court cases 
where visitation has been granted under a best interest or other 
standard404 frequently reveals distressing intrusions by a powerful and 
nearly irresistible state judiciary. Many ordinary parents, particularly 
those struggling with the financial challenges of raising children, 
simply cannot defend against these intrusions. It is questionable 
whether these visitation orders are ultimately benefiting children or 
harming them.  
In the final analysis, the Utah Grandparent Visitation Statute 
should be amended to better balance the competing needs and 
interests of children, parents, and grandparents by defining and 
requiring a heightened showing of harm. Such an amendment will 
better ensure that, when appropriate, a grandparent visitation order 
will not cause greater harm to children than the visitation will 
prevent. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute may be an 
improvement over the lack of a common law grandparent visitation 
right in today’s changed society, the Statute must be limited. The 
 
 399. Deem v. Lobato, 96 P.3d 1186 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). 
 400. Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 522–23 (Mont. 2006). 
 401. The Wyoming Supreme Court has not ruled on the statute’s constitutionality since 
Troxel but applies a best interest and reasonability analysis with a requirement to show that an 
order would not impair parental rights. See, e.g., Hede v. Gilstrap, 107 P.3d 158 (Wyo. 2005). 
 402. See Leavitt v. Leavitt, 132 P.3d 421 (Idaho 2006) (declining to reach constitutional 
issue since review of magistrate’s decision was in parent’s favor); see also Beyer, supra note 395. 
 403. See generally supra note 391. 
 404. See generally supra notes 392–94. 
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early history of the Statute indicates that its purpose was to prevent 
harm to children, not to advance the privileges of adults. 
Courts, including the highest court in the land, have had 
difficulty balancing the needs and rights of parents and children with 
the mandates of state grandparent visitation statutes. The Utah 
legislature has now had experience revising its statute multiple times 
under both state and federal constitutional directives. Utah courts 
have also had experience trying to apply these various iterations of 
the Statute. This Comment has presented exhaustive detail about the 
history of these efforts. And now, the Utah Supreme Court has 
invited the legislature to make one more revision to the Statute on 
the basis of this experience. 
This Comment has laid a foundation to suggest that the 
legislature should revise the Grandparent Visitation Statute to 
require a heightened showing of harm. Grandparents should not be 
able to rebut the parental presumption without showing that a 
parent is unfit and that his or her visitation decision will substantially 
harm the children. Alternatively, grandparents could be required to 
show that the children’s health, safety, and welfare will be harmed 
more without a visitation order than they would be if they were 
subject to a visitation order. Only upon this showing should the 
court then examine whether the amount and type of visitation 
preferred by the parent is reasonably suited to prevent the harm that 
would be caused without a visitation order. If it is, the court should 
defer to the parent’s visitation decision. Rebutting the parental 
presumption on any lesser showing of harm unnecessarily intrudes 
on the lives of children and parents and makes court-ordered 
visitation like a wolf in disguise that ultimately harms the very 
children it is intended to protect. 
Tracy C. Schofield 
